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DC&PT - Thời
Sự 2010
Bộ quốc phòng Mĩ
Tường trình về chính sách bành trướng quân sự của Trung quốc
Vừa qua Bộ Quốc phòng Hoa kì đã công bố chính sách
và các mục tiêu bành trướng quân sự của chế độ Bắc kinh ở Á châu, đặc
biệt là Đông Nam Á. Điều đáng để ý là đã có Timing giữa việc công bố này
với một số hoạt động quân sự của Mĩ ở Đông Á và Đông Nam Á. Vì hiện nay
Mĩ và Đại hàn đang mở cuộc thao diễn quân sự lớn ở ngoài khơi Nam Hàn
giáp với Bắc hàn, một đồng minh của Trung quốc. Cao điểm nữa là Hà nội và
Washington vừa mở cuộc Thảo luận về hợp tác quốc phòng lần đầu tiên ở Hà
nội. Trước đó ít ngày, một tầu chiến Mĩ đã ghé thăm Đà nẵng và một hàng
không mẫu hạm Mĩ đã bỏ neo ở biển Đông và mời một số sĩ quan VN lên thăm
viếng. Tất cả các động tác này đang làm Bắc kinh rất bực bội.
Dưới đây là nguyên văn bản tường trình của Bộ Quốc
phòng Mi.
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of
China 2010
Office
of the Secretary of Defense
Military
and Security Developments Involving the
People’s
Republic of China 2010
A
Report to Congress
Pursuant
to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal
Year 2010
Section 1246, “Annual
Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China,”
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public
Law
111-84, which
amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
Section
1202, Public Law
106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in
both
classified and
unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the
People’s
Republic of China.
The report shall address the current and probable future course of
militarytechnological
development of the
People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable
development of
Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military
organizations
and operational
concepts, through the next 20 years. The report shall also address United
States-China
engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered
by the
report, including
through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the United
States strategy
for such engagement and cooperation in the future.”
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Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
I
Executive
Summary
Over the past 30
years, China
has made great progress in its pursuit of economic growth and
development, which
has allowed China
to achieve higher living standards for the Chinese people
and has increased China’s
international profile. These economic achievements, combined with
progress in
science and technology, have also enabled China to embark on a
comprehensive
transformation of
its military. The pace and scope of China’s military
modernization have
increased over the
past decade, enabling China’s
armed forces to develop capabilities to
contribute to the
delivery of international public goods, as well as increase China’s
options for
using military
force to gain diplomatic advantage or resolve disputes in its favor.
Earlier this
decade, China
began a new phase of military development by articulating roles and
missions for the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that go beyond China’s immediate territorial
interests. Some of
these missions and associated capabilities have allowed the PLA to
contribute
to international
peacekeeping efforts, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and
counterpiracy
operations. The United States
recognizes and welcomes these contributions. Other
investments have
allowed the PLA to pursue anti-access and area-denial strategies. Still
others
appear designed to
improve the PLA’s ability for extended-range power projection, although
China’s ability to
sustain military power at a distance, today, remains limited. As the 2010
Quadrennial
Defense Review Report notes, “China is developing and
fielding large numbers of
advanced
medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines
equipped with
advanced weapons,
increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare
and
computer network
attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space
systems.”
Cross-Strait
economic and cultural ties continued to make important progress in 2009. Despite
these positive
trends, China’s
military build-up opposite the island continued unabated. The
PLA is developing
the capability to deter Taiwan
independence or influence Taiwan
to settle the
dispute on Beijing’s terms
while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny any possible
U.S. support for the
island in case of conflict. The balance of cross-Strait military forces
continues to shift
in the mainland’s favor.
The PLA has made
modest improvements in the transparency of China’s military and security
affairs. However,
many uncertainties remain regarding how China will use its expanding
military
capabilities. The limited transparency in China’s military and security
affairs enhances
uncertainty and
increases the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation.
As President Obama
has said, “[the U.S.-China] relationship has not been without
disagreement
and difficulty.
But the notion that we must be adversaries is not pre-destined.” Sustained
and
reliable
U.S.-China military-to-military relations support this goal by reducing
mistrust,
enhancing mutual
understanding and broadening cooperation. China’s recurring decision to
suspend military
exchanges has impeded this effort. The Department of Defense will
continue to
use its
interactions with China
to encourage it to play a constructive role in addressing common
security
challenges in Asia and globally. At the
same time, the Department of Defense has a
special
responsibility to monitor China’s
military and to deter conflict. Through force posture,
presence,
capability developments, and actions to strengthen alliances and
partnerships, the
Department of
Defense demonstrates the United
States’ will and ability to maintain
peace and
stability in the
Asia-Pacific.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China II
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Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China III
Table
of Contents
Executive Summary
.........................................................................................................................
I
Glossary of
Acronyms
...................................................................................................................
V
Chapter One:
Annual Update
.........................................................................................................
1
Developments in
the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait
..................................................... 1
Developments in
the Size, Location, and Capabilities of PRC Military Forces
......................... 1
Developments in
PLA Doctrine
..................................................................................................
4
Developments in
PRC Efforts to Develop, Acquire, or Gain Access to Advanced Technologies
that Could Enhance
its Military Capabilities
..............................................................................
6
Challenges to Taiwan’s
Deterrent Forces
...................................................................................
6
Developments in China’s
Space and Cyber Capabilities
............................................................ 7
China’s Foreign
Military
Engagement........................................................................................
7
U.S. Engagement and
Cooperation on Security Matters
.......................................................... 10
Chapter Two:
Understanding China’s
Strategy
...........................................................................
13
Overview
..................................................................................................................................
13
China’s Strategic
Priorities
.......................................................................................................
15
Debates on Future
Strategy .......................................................................................................
18
The New Historic
Missions
......................................................................................................
18
China’s Military Strategy
..........................................................................................................
22
Secrecy and
Deception in PLA Military Strategy
..................................................................... 26
Asymmetric
Warfighting
..........................................................................................................
27
Chapter Three:
Force Modernization Goals and Trends
.............................................................. 29
Overview
..................................................................................................................................
29
Anti-Access/Area-Denial
Capabilities
......................................................................................
29
Extended Operational
Reach
.....................................................................................................
33
Strategic
Capabilities
................................................................................................................
34
Power Projection
-- Modernization Beyond Taiwan
................................................................ 37
Chapter Four:
Resources for Force Modernization
..................................................................... 41
Overview ..................................................................................................................................
41
Military
Expenditure Trends
.....................................................................................................
41
China’s Advancing
Defense Industries
.....................................................................................
43
Looking to the
Future: Trends and Projections
........................................................................ 47
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China IV
Chapter Five:
Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan
Strait ....................................... 49
Overview
..................................................................................................................................
49
Beijing’s Strategy in the
Taiwan Strait
.....................................................................................
50
Beijing’s Courses of
Action Against Taiwan ...........................................................................
51
Chapter Six:
U.S.-China Military-to-Military Contacts
.............................................................. 53
Overview
..................................................................................................................................
53
Opportunities and
Challenges in U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations
........................... 53
Appendix I: China and Taiwan Forces Data
.................................................................................
59
Appendix II:
Military-to-Military Exchanges
...............................................................................
67
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China V
Glossary
of Acronyms
AAV:
Amphibious Assault Vehicle
AEW&C:
Airborne Early Warning and Control
APCSS:
Asia Pacific Center
for Security Studies
ASAT:
Anti-Satellite
ASBM:
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
ASCM:
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
bcm:
billion cubic meters
b/d:
barrels per day
C4ISR:
Command, Control, Communications,
Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance,
and
Reconnaissance
CCP:
Chinese Communist Party
CMC:
Central Military Commission
CNO:
Computer Network Operations
COMSAT:
Communications Satellite
CONUS:
Continental United
States
DCT:
Defense Consultative Talks
DDG:
Guided-Missile Destroyer
DPCT:
Defense Policy Coordination Talks
DSS:
Defense Security Service
DSTL:
Developing Sciences and
Technologies
List
EEZ:
Exclusive Economic Zone
EU:
European Union
FAO:
Foreign Affairs Office
FFG:
Guided-Missile Frigate
GDP:
Gross Domestic Product
GPS:
Global Positioning System
HA/DR:
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
ICBM:
Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile
IJO:
Integrated Joint Operations
LACM:
Land Attack Cruise Missile
MIRV:
Multiple Independently Targeted
Re-entry
Vehicles
MMCA:
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
MND:
Ministry of National Defense
MR:
Military Region
MRBM:
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
MRL:
Multiple Rocket Launcher
NCO:
Non-Commissioned Officer
NDU:
National Defense University
NFU:
No First Use
OMTE:
Outline of Military Training and Evaluation
OTH:
Over-the-Horizon
PLA:
People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF:
People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PRC:
People’s Republic of China
R&D:
Research and Development
S&ED:
Strategic and Economic Dialogue
SAM:
Surface-to-Air Missile
SCO:
Shanghai
Cooperation Organization
SLBM:
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLOC:
Sea Lines of Communication
SRBM:
Short-Range Ballistic Missile
SS:
Diesel-Electric Attack Submarine
SSBN:
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile
Submarine
SSN:
Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine
UAV:
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCAV:
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
UN:
United Nations
UNCLOS:
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
USCG:
United States
Coast Guard
USMC:
United States
Marine Corps
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China VI
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Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
1
Chapter
One: Annual Update
“The future and
destiny of contemporary China
is more and more closely linked to the future and
destiny of the
world. China’s development cannot be done without the world, and the
world’s
development needs China.”
– People’s
Republic of China
President Hu Jintao
Several
significant developments in China over the past year
relate to the questions Congress posed
in Section 1246 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law
111-84).
DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE SECURITY
SITUATION
IN THE TAIWAN
STRAIT
Since the election
of President Ma Ying-jeou in
March 2008, the
People’s Republic of China
(PRC) has promoted
greater cross-Strait
engagement. Both Beijing and Taipei
have
emphasized
enhancing semi-official, people-topeople
and party-to-party
contacts, and
expanding economic
and cultural ties. There
have been no
meaningful actions on the part of
the mainland,
however, to reduce the PRC
military presence
opposite the island.
President Hu Jintao made a major speech on
December 31, 2008,
in which he set forth
key elements of Beijing’s
cross-Strait
policy. The speech
signaled greater
flexibility on Taiwan’s
international status
and suggested
expanded contacts between
the two sides’
militaries. It also included an
explicit outreach
to Taiwan’s
historically
pro-independence
opposition Democratic
Progressive Party,
on the condition that it
relinquishes its
independence activities. In
May 2009, China
exercised greater
flexibility on Taiwan’s
international
participation by
not objecting to Taiwan’s
participation in
the World Health Assembly
as an observer.
Although cross-Strait
military contacts
did not expand materially
in 2009, Beijing and Taipei
continued
negotiations on an
Economic Cooperation
Framework
Agreement.
In May 2009, Wang Yi, Chairman of the
mainland’s Taiwan
Affairs Office—an
office under the
State Council that is
responsible for
setting and implementing
policies related
to Taiwan—expanded
upon
the theme of Beijing’s
willingness to
discuss military
confidence-building
measures by
stating that the PRC and
Taiwan should not avoid
discussing difficult
political and military
issues. He said that a
failure to resolve
such topics could result in
a bottleneck in
the development of cross-
Strait relations.
DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE SIZE,
LOCATION,
AND CAPABILITIES OF
PRC
MILITARY FORCES
China’s long-term,
comprehensive
transformation of
its military forces is
improving its
capacity for force projection and
anti-access/area-denial.
Consistent with a nearterm
focus on preparing
for Taiwan Strait
contingencies, China
continues to deploy many
of its most
advanced systems to the military
regions (MRs)
opposite Taiwan.
Ballistic and
Cruise Missiles. China has the
most active
land-based ballistic and cruise
missile program in
the world. It is developing
and testing
several new classes and variants of
offensive
missiles, forming additional missile
units,
qualitatively upgrading certain missile
systems, and
developing methods to counter
ballistic missile
defenses.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
2
The PLA is acquiring large numbers of
highly accurate
cruise missiles, such as the
domestically-produced
ground-launched
DH-10 land-attack
cruise missile (LACM);
the domestically
produced ground- and
ship-launched
YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile
(ASCM), which is
outfitted on the
domestically produced
LUYANG II-class
guided-missile
destroyer (DDGs); the
Russian
SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic
ASCM, which is
outfitted on China’s
SOVREMENNYY-class
DDGs acquired
from Russia;
and, the Russian SS-N-
27B/SIZZLER
supersonic ASCM, which is
outfitted on China’s
Russian-built, KILOclass
diesel electric
submarines.
By December 2009, the PLA had deployed
between 1,050 and
1,150 CSS-6 and CSS-7
short-range
ballistic missiles (SRBM) to
units opposite Taiwan.
It is upgrading the
lethality of this
force, including by
introducing
variants of these missiles with
improved ranges,
accuracies, and payloads.
China is developing an anti-ship ballistic
missile (ASBM)
based on a variant of the
CSS-5 medium-range
ballistic missile
(MRBM). The
missile has a range in excess
of 1,500 km, is
armed with a maneuverable
warhead, and when
integrated with
appropriate
command and control systems,
is intended to
provide the PLA the
capability to
attack ships, including aircraft
carriers, in the
western Pacific Ocean.
China is modernizing its nuclear forces by
adding more
survivable delivery systems.
For example, in
recent years the road
mobile, solid
propellant DF-31 and DF-31A
intercontinental
range ballistic missiles
(ICBM) have
entered service. The DF-31A,
with a range in
excess of 11,200 km, can
reach most
locations within the continental
United States (CONUS).
China may also be developing a new roadmobile
ICBM, possibly
capable of carrying
a multiple
independently targeted re-entry
vehicles (MIRV).
Naval Forces. The PLA Navy has
the largest
force of principal
combatants, submarines, and
amphibious warfare
ships in Asia. China’s
naval forces
include some 75 principal
combatants, more
than 60 submarines, 55
medium and large
amphibious ships, and
roughly 85
missile-equipped patrol craft.
Construction of a new PLA Navy base on
Hainan Island is essentially
complete. The
base is large
enough to accommodate a mix
of attack and
ballistic missile submarines
and advanced
surface combatants. The
base, which has
underground facilities,
provides the PLA
Navy with direct access
to vital
international sea lanes, and offers
the potential for
stealthy deployment of
submarines into
the South China Sea.
China has an active aircraft carrier research
and development
program. The PRC
shipbuilding
industry could start
construction of an
indigenous platform by
the end of this
year. China
is interested in
building multiple
operational aircraft
carriers with
support ships in the next
decade.
The PLA Navy has reportedly decided to
initiate a program
to train 50 pilots to
operate fixed-wing
aircraft from an aircraft
carrier. The
initial program, presumably
land-based, would
be followed in about four
years by
ship-borne training involving the
ex-VARYAG—a former
Soviet Kuznetsovclass
aircraft carrier—which
was purchased
by China from Ukraine in 1998 and is being
renovated at a
shipyard in Dalian, China.
The PLA Navy is improving its over-thehorizon
(OTH) targeting
capability with
Sky Wave and
Surface Wave OTH radars.
OTH radars could
be used in conjunction
with imagery
satellites to assist in locating
targets at great
distances from PRC shores
to support long
range precision strikes,
including by
anti-ship ballistic missiles.
China continues production of its newest
JIN-class (Type
094) nuclear powered
ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN). China
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
3
may field up to
five new SSBNs. One JINclass
SSBN has entered
service alongside
two new
SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclearpowered
attack submarines
(SSN), four
older HAN-class
SSNs, and China’s
single
XIA-class SSBN.
China is further expanding its current force
of nuclear-powered
attack submarines and
may add up to five
advanced Type 095
SSNs to the
inventory in the coming years.
China has 13 SONG-class (Type 039)
diesel-electric
attack submarines (SS) in its
inventory. The
SONG-class SS is designed
to carry the YJ-82
ASCM. The follow-on
to the SONG is the
YUAN-class SS, as
many as four of
which are already in
service. China
may plan to construct 15
additional hulls
for this class. The YUANclass
SS are armed
similarly to the SONGclass
SS, but also
include a possible air
independent
propulsion system. The SONG
SS, YUAN SS, and
SHANG SSN will be
capable of
launching the new CH-SS-NX-
13 ASCM, once the
missile completes
development and
testing.
The PLA Navy continues its acquisition of
domestically
produced surface combatants.
These include two
LUYANG II-class (Type
052C) DDGs fitted
with the indigenous
HHQ-9 long-range
surface-to-air missile
(SAM); two
LUZHOU-class (Type 051C)
DDGs equipped with
the Russian SA-N-20
long-range SAM;
and four (soon to be six)
JIANGKAI II-class
(Type 054A) guidedmissile
frigates (FFG) to
be fitted with the
medium-range
HHQ-16 vertically launched
naval SAM
currently under development.
These ships
reflect the leadership’s priority
on an advanced
anti-air warfare capability
for China’s
naval forces, which has
historically been
a weakness of the fleet.
China has deployed some 60 of its new
HOUBEI-class (Type
022) wave-piercing
catamaran hull
missile patrol boats. Each
boat can carry up
to eight YJ-83 ASCMs.
Air and Air
Defense Forces. China bases 490
combat aircraft
within unrefueled operational
range of Taiwan,
and has the airfield capacity to
expand that number
by hundreds. Many of
these aircraft are
upgrades of older models;
Informatization
The concept of “informatization”
(xinxihua—信息化) emphasizes the
effects of modern
information
technology on military decision and weapons employment cycles. The term
officially entered
the PLA’s lexicon in 2002 when then-Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
General Secretary
and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Jiang Zemin, in a speech
before the 16th
Party
Congress, referred to the concept as necessary for the PLA’s rapid
modernization and
for enabling Integrated Joint Operations. Jiang’s address recognized that
moving China’s
military on a path toward informatization would require integrating the
entire
PLA with common
information systems, as well as a new organizational model for
warfighting.
The PLA formally
institutionalized the concept in 2004. PLA analyses of U.S. and coalition
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have re-emphasized
the importance of informatization and
joint operations.
The PLA is
attempting the concurrent pursuit of “mechanization” (application of late
20th-
Century industrial
technology to military operations) and “informatization” (application of
information technology
to military operations). As a consequence, and in recognition of the
high costs of
force-wide refitting with state-of-the-art weapons systems, the PLA is
selectively
acquiring new
generation technologies in some areas, while deferring new acquisitions
in others
in favor of
upgrading older, but capable, systems for networked operations.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
4
however, newer and
more advanced aircraft
make up a growing
percentage of the inventory.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) celebrated its
60th
Anniversary
on November 11, 2009.
During the
anniversary ceremony, CMC
Vice Chairman
General Guo Boxiong urged
the PLAAF to
accelerate the development
of new weapons
systems, improve the
PLAAF’s logistics
systems, and improve
joint operations
training. In an interview on
the occasion of
the anniversary, PLAAF
Commander General
Xu Qiliang said that
the trend of
military competition extending
to space is “inevitable”
and emphasized the
transformation of
the PLAAF from a
homeland defense
focus to one that
“integrates air
and space,” and that
possesses both “offensive
and defensive”
capabilities.
China is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleet
(originally
adapted from the Russian Tu-16)
with a new variant
that, when operational,
will be armed with
a new long-range cruise
missile.
The PLAAF has continued to expand its
inventory of
long-range, advanced SAM
systems and now
possesses one of the
largest such
forces in the world. Over the
past five years, China’s
efforts have
included the
acquisition of a number of SA-
20 PMU2
battalions, the most advanced
SAM system offered
for export by Russia,
and the
introduction of the indigenously
designed HQ-9.
China’s aviation industry is developing
several types of
airborne early warning and
control
(AEW&C) aircraft. This includes
the KJ-200, based
on the Y-8 transport, for
AEW&C as well
as intelligence collection
and maritime
surveillance, and the KJ-2000,
based on a
modified IL-76 transport
airframe.
Ground Forces. The PLA has about
1.25
million personnel
in its ground forces, with
roughly 400,000
based in the three MRs
opposite Taiwan.
China
is upgrading ground
forces units with
modern tanks, armored
personnel
carriers, and artillery. Among the
new capabilities
acquired by, or under
development for,
PLA ground forces are Type
99
third-generation main battle tanks, a newgeneration
amphibious assault
vehicle (AAV),
and 200-mm,
300-mm, and 400-mm multiple
rocket launch
systems.
In 2009, the PLA focused training and
exercises on
command and control, joint
ground and air
coordination, mobility and
mobilization in
information warfare, and
assault
operations.
In addition to the active ground forces,
China has a reserve
force of some 500,000
(as of 2008) and a
large militia that can be
mobilized in
wartime to support the war
effort within
their home provinces.
Although China
plans to reduce the size of
the organized
militia from 10 million to 8
million by the end
of the 11th Five Year
Plan (2006-2010),
all males between 18 and
35 years of age
not currently serving in the
military are
technically part of the militia
system.
DEVELOPMENTS
IN PLA DOCTRINE
In 2009, the PLA
continued to emphasize
training in line
with recent doctrinal
developments that
emphasize non-war
missions, as well
as training for war under
realistic,
high-tech conditions. These PLA
efforts to achieve
more informatized joint
training were
highlighted in China’s
2008
Defense White
Paper and marked a
continuation of
efforts to implement the revised
Outline of
Military Training and Evaluation
(OMTE), which was
published in mid-2008 and
became standard
across the PLA on January 1,
2009.
The new OMTE emphasizes realistic
training
conditions, training in complex
electromagnetic
and joint environments, and
integrating new
and high technologies into
the force
structure.
PLA group armies diversified their 2009
training to
include military operations other
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
5
than war. The
training now includes antiterrorism,
emergency
response, disaster
relief, and
international peace operations.
The PLA continues to emphasize enabling
joint operations.
For example, the PLA
established the
Jinan Theater Joint
Leadership
Organization—the first of its
kind—to integrate,
at the campaign level, all
services,
including the Second Artillery
Corps, as well as
provincial leadership and
leading personnel
from other organizations.
Enabling Modern
Warfare: Joint Operations
China’s military has
been working for several years to develop the capability to conduct
integrated joint
operations (IJO), a concept the PRC believes essential to modern warfare.
IJO
are characterized
by the integration of multiple service elements under a joint command
headquarters,
making full use of advanced information technology and a networked
command
platform. China’s
research, training, and preparations for joint operations have evolved
substantially
since the promulgation of its first joint campaign doctrine in the late
1990s, but
serious challenges
limit the PLA’s ability to conduct IJO through at least 2010.
Early Chinese attempts at joint operations
focused on the cooperation of branches within a
service and
operations loosely coordinated among the services using phased
operations.
The PLA issued its first doctrine for the
conduct of joint operations in 1999. However, PLA
training and
exercises for several years after the doctrine’s establishment reflected
a reliance
on pre-determined
sequencing of service operations with little interaction or integration
of
the forces.
Recent efforts toward more integrated operations
are embodied in the January 2009 edition
of the PLA OMTE.
This OMTE has been noted in official Chinese media as a new starting
point for IJO and
as making PLA training more joint and complex.
Obstacles. China’s military
leaders recognize and acknowledge that one of the primary
obstacles to IJO
is that many PLA commanders have little or no training for, or experience
operating in, a
joint environment. Key challenges include a shortage of commanders and
staff
qualified for such
operations; a lack of understanding of the capabilities, equipment, and
tactics
of the other
services; and a lack of advanced technology to enable communication and
information
sharing among the services.
Efforts to
Improve. To rectify these deficiencies, the PLA launched enhanced training
and
professional
military education, cross-training rotational assignments to different
services, war
simulations,
military training coordination zones, and multi-regional military
exercises. In
2009, the PLA
conducted at least three high-profile joint exercises through
mid-September,
including a joint
ground-air exercise involving cross-military region deployment of up to
50,000
troops, a joint
campaign exercise to train theater-level commanders in joint operations,
and a
joint
anti-terrorism exercise with Russia.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
6
DEVELOPMENTS
IN PRC EFFORTS
TO
DEVELOP, ACQUIRE, OR GAIN
ACCESS
TO ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGIES
THAT COULD
ENHANCE
ITS MILITARY
CAPABILITIES
China relies on foreign
technology, acquisition
of key dual-use
components, and focused
indigenous
research and development to
advance military
modernization.
The PRC utilizes a
large, well-organized
network of
enterprises, defense factories and
affiliated
research institutes and computer
network operations
to facilitate the collection of
sensitive
information and export-controlled
technology. These
entities are not necessarily
nor always linked
to PRC intelligence and
security services.
Many of the
enterprises and institutes that make
up the PRC
military-industrial complex have
both military and
civilian research and
development
functions. This network of
commercial and
government-affiliated
companies and
research institutes often enables
the PLA to gain
access to sensitive and dual-use
technologies or
knowledgeable experts under
the guise of
civilian research and development.
The enterprises
and institutes accomplish this
through technology
conferences and symposia;
legitimate
contracts and joint commercial
ventures;
partnerships with foreign firms; and,
joint development
of specific technologies.
In the case of key
national security
technologies,
controlled equipment, and other
materials not
readily obtainable through
commercial means
or academia, the PRC
resorts to more
focused efforts, including the
use of its
intelligence services and other-thanlegal
means, in violation
of U.S.
laws and
export controls.
Since 2008, U.S.
press
reporting has
publicized a number of cases
spotlighting the
measures taken to procure
items perceived by
the PRC as crucial to its
technological
development and military
modernization. Even
though cases primarily
involve charges of
illegal technology transfer
by individuals
within the United
States to the
PRC, traditional
espionage does occur.
In July 2009, PRC national Chi Tong Kuok
was indicted for
violating U.S.
export laws
after allegedly
attempting to obtain sensitive
cryptology
equipment that would have
allowed the PRC to
monitor U.S.
military
communications.
Another case involved a former U.S. Pacific
Command liaison
official, who was charged
in May 2009 with
knowingly passing
classified and
unclassified information,
including U.S.
policy documents, to a PRC
agent.
In July 2009, a former professor at the
University of Tennessee was sentenced to
four years
imprisonment for a case
involving the
export to PRC nationals of
controlled
technical data related to a
restricted U.S.
Air Force contract to develop
plasma actuators
for an unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV).
CHALLENGES
TO TAIWAN’S
DETERRENT
FORCES
There were no
armed incidents in the vicinity of
the Taiwan Strait in 2009 and the overall
situation remains
stable, as it did in 2008.
However, the PRC’s
military build-up and the
deployment of
advanced capabilities opposite
the island have
not eased.
Since arriving in
office in May 2008, President
Ma Ying-jeou has
instituted a number of
important and
far-reaching defense reforms
designed to
streamline and professionalize the
military. Taiwan
continues to advance select
capabilities and
improve its overall contingency
training. The
balance of forces continues,
however, to shift
in the mainland’s favor.
Taiwan plans to cut its military force to
215,000 troops and
transition to an allvolunteer
military by the
end of 2014. It
will also
reorganize several support
commands and
civilianize its key defense
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
7
research and
development facility to
improve efficiency
and productivity.
Consistent with the provisions of the
Taiwan Relations Act,
Public Law 96-8
(1979), the United States
continues to make
available defense
articles and defense
services to enable
Taiwan
to maintain a
sufficient
self-defense capability. Toward
this end, in
January 2010, the Obama
Administration
announced its intent to sell
to Taiwan
$6.4 billion in defensive arms
and equipment,
including UH-60 utility
helicopters;
PATRIOT PAC-3 air and
missile defense
systems; HARPOON
training missiles;
Multifunctional
Information
Distribution Systems technical
support for Taiwan’s
Po-sheng command,
control, communications,
computers,
intelligence,
surveillance, and
reconnaissance
(C4ISR) system; and
OSPREY-class
minehunting ships.
DEVELOPMENTS
IN CHINA’S
SPACE
AND
CYBER CAPABILITIES
Space and
Counterspace Capabilities. China
is expanding its
space-based intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance,
navigation, and
communications satellite
constellations. In
parallel, China
is developing a multidimensional
program to improve
its capabilities
to limit or
prevent the use of space-based assets
by potential
adversaries during times of crisis or
conflict. China’s
commercial space program
has utility for
non-military research, but it also
demonstrates space
launch and control
capabilities that
have direct military application.
Beijing launched a navigation satellite on
April 15, 2009,
and plans to have a full
network to provide
global positioning for
military and
civilian users by 2015-2020.
China launched Yaogan-6 on February 22,
2009, the 6th
in a
series of new
reconnaissance
satellites orbited since 2006.
Russia launched a commercial
communications
satellite (COMSAT),
Asiasat-5, for China
on September 11,
2009. Beijing launched a
commercial
COMSAT, Palapa-D,
for Indonesia
on
August 31, 2009.
China continues development and testing of
the Long March V
rocket. Intended to lift
heavy payloads
into space, it will more than
double the size of
the Low Earth Orbit and
Geosynchronous
Orbit payloads that China
can currently
place into orbit. To support
these new rockets,
China
began construction
of a launch
facility near Wenchang on
Hainan Island in 2008.
Cyberwarfare
Capabilities. In 2009, numerous
computer systems
around the world, including
those owned by the
U.S. Government,
continued to be
the target of intrusions that
appear to have
originated within the PRC.
These intrusions
focused on exfiltrating
information, some
of which could be of
strategic or
military utility. The accesses and
skills required
for these intrusions are similar to
those necessary to
conduct computer network
attacks. It
remains unclear if these intrusions
were conducted by,
or with the endorsement of,
the PLA or other
elements of the PRC
government.
However, developing capabilities
for cyberwarfare
is consistent with authoritative
PLA military
writings.
In March 2009, Canadian researchers
uncovered an
electronic spy network,
apparently based
mainly in China,
which
had reportedly
infiltrated Indian and other
nations’
government offices around the
world. More than
1,300 computers in 103
countries were
identified.
CHINA’S
FOREIGN MILITARY
ENGAGEMENT
China’s military
engagement with other
countries seeks to
enhance China’s
national
power by improving
foreign relationships,
bolstering its
international image, and assuaging
other countries’
concerns about China’s
rise.
The PLA’s
activities also assist its
modernization
through the acquisition of
advanced weapons
systems, increased
operational
experience both within and beyond
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
8
Asia, and access to
foreign military
management
practices, operational doctrine,
and training
methods.
China continues the Gulf of Aden counterpiracy
deployment that
began in December
2008. The PLA Navy
in December 2009
sent its fourth
deployment, with three
frigates and one
supply ship. Outside of
occasional ship
visits, this represents the
PLA Navy’s first
series of operational
deployments beyond
the immediate western
Pacific region.
The Ministry of National Defense (MND) in
August 2009
launched an official website in
both Chinese and
English to promote a
positive image of China’s
military to
foreign audiences.
In July 2009, the MND announced that
China would
comprehensively expand
foreign military
relations through initiatives
such as:
maintaining military attaché
offices in 109
countries; annually sending
more than 100
military delegations abroad
and receiving more
than 200 visiting
military
delegations; conducting high-level
strategic
consultations and professional and
technical
exchanges; and organizing study
abroad exchanges
for mid-grade and junior
officers.
Combined
Exercises. PLA participation in
bilateral and
multilateral exercises is increasing.
The PLA derives
political benefit through
increased
influence and enhanced ties with
partner states and
organizations. Such exercises
also contribute to
PLA modernization by
providing
opportunities to improve capabilities
in areas such as
counterterrorism, mobility
operations, and
logistics. The PLA also gains
operational
insights by observing tactics,
command
decision-making, and equipment
used by more advanced
militaries.
The PLA Navy in March conducted search
and rescue
operations during “AMAN
2009,” a
multilateral naval exercise hosted
by Pakistan.
China and Gabon conducted “Peace Angel
2009” in June, a
military medical exercise
in Gabon.
This is the first exercise of this
sort in which China
has participated.
China and Singapore conducted
“Cooperation 2009”
in June, a combined
training exercise
that focused on responding
to a terrorist
plot to use nuclear weapons.
In late June through early July, China and
Mongolia held “Peacekeeping
Mission
2009,” the first
combined training between
the two countries.
The Sino-Russian counterterrorism exercise
“Peace Mission
2009” was held in July and
involved roughly
1,300 PLA troops. It
focused on air
assault, joint operations, and
special
operations.
Peacekeeping and
Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Relief
Operations. Since 2002,
China’s contributions
to United Nations (UN)-
sponsored peace
operations have increased.
Presently more
than 2,100 on-duty PRC
personnel are
serving in UN missions, with a
total contribution
of more than 12,000
personnel deployed
to 22 missions. China
is
now the leading
contributor of peacekeeping
personnel among
the five permanent members
of the UN Security
Council. China’s
contributions have
included engineering,
logistics, and
medical troops, civilian police,
and observers.
In March 2009, PRC peacekeepers deployed
to Lebanon’s
southern border began using
advanced explosive
ordnance disposal
technologies and
techniques, including
robot detectors,
to sweep landmines.
China’s civilian and
military leaders have
identified
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
(HA/DR) as an area
for China
to cooperate with
regional and
global partners.
In May 2009, the State Council released a
white paper
entitled, “China’s
Actions for
Disaster
Prevention and Reduction.”
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
9
The paper included
a call to strengthen
capacity for
emergency rescue and relief
work at home and
abroad, and to establish a
coordinated and
efficient disaster
management system.
In May 2009, China’s 10,000-ton ANWEIclass
hospital ship, the
“Peace Ark,”
conducted its
first operational training
event. This also was
the first time the ship
was open to
foreign navies.
Arms Sales
Beijing uses arms sales
to enhance foreign relationships and to generate revenue to support its
domestic defense
industry. China’s
arms sales range from small arms and ammunition to
transfers of
advanced weapons systems. Over the past thirty years, arms sales have
generally
declined in
importance to Beijing
as a tool of influence, particularly as PRC weapons systems
became less
competitive compared to the more sophisticated systems available from Russia
or
Western sources.
As the quality of PRC weapons systems improves, however, this trend may
reverse. From
2005-2009, China
sold approximately $8 billion worth of conventional weapons
systems worldwide.
PRC companies sell primarily to developing countries, where China’s
lowcost
weapons are able
to achieve market access. In other instances, arms sales serve to
cultivate
relationships with
important strategic partners, such as Pakistan.
PRC
Worldwide Arms Sales. Arms sales
for 2005-2009, divided by region.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
10
U.S.
ENGAGEMENT AND
COOPERATION
ON SECURITY
MATTERS
Military-to-Military
Ties. U.S.-China militaryto-
military relations
improved in 2009, based
on the commitment
of President Obama and
President Hu to
deepen and improve ties
between the U.S.
and PRC armed forces, and to
take concrete
steps to advance sustained and
reliable
military-to-military relations.
High-level
dialogues provided important
platforms for building
toward common views
on the
international security environment and
related security
challenges. Examples from
2009 include:
The Secretary of Defense hosted PRC CMC
Vice Chairman
General Xu Caihou in
October—the first
such visit in three years.
The two agreed to
a number of cooperative
exchanges and
high-level visits, and
exchanged views on
regional security
issues.
The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
attended the PLA
Navy’s International Fleet
Review in April,
and the U.S. Chief of Staff
of the Army
visited China
in August.
The Department of
Defense is also investing in
an expanded suite
of mechanisms for dialogue
and consultation
with China,
seeking to build
towards continuous
dialogue at all levels to
expand cooperation
in areas where U.S.
and
PRC national
interests converge, and to discuss
constructively
differences.
In June, the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy held the
U.S.-China Defense
Consultative Talks
(DCT) with the Deputy
Chief of the PLA
General Staff in Beijing.
The DCT served as
a platform for the two
sides to exchange
views and explore
avenues for
cooperation, including on Iran,
North Korea, piracy, and
defense policy
development.
In August, the United States and China
convened a special
session of the Military
Maritime Consultative
Agreement (MMCA)
to discuss safe
maritime security practices
and issues in China’s
claimed exclusive
economic zone
(EEZ).
In December, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of
Defense for East Asia held the
U.S.-China Defense
Policy Coordination
Talks (DPCT) with
the Director, MND
Foreign Affairs
Office (FAO). The two
sides discussed a
range of security issues,
including climate
change, counter-piracy,
internationally
lawful uses of the sea, and
future
military-to-military exchanges.
Despite these
positive developments, Beijing
chose to suspend
military-to-military exchanges
in January 2010
following the Obama
Administration’s
announcement of its intent to
sell defensive
arms and equipment to Taiwan.
Non-Military
Security Ties. The first round of
the U.S.-China
Strategic and Economic
Dialogue
(S&ED) was held in Washington,
D.C. on July
27-28, 2009. The S&ED focused
on addressing the
challenges and opportunities
that both
countries face on a wide range of
bilateral,
regional, and global areas of
immediate and
long-term strategic and
economic
interests. The S&ED is led by the
Secretary of State
and the Secretary of the
Treasury on the U.S.
side, and by State
Councilor Dai
Bingguo and Vice Premier Wang
Qishan on the PRC
side. Many other Cabinetlevel
and other senior U.S.
officials attended,
including the
Secretary of Energy, the Under
Secretary of
Defense for Policy, and the
Commander, U.S.
Pacific Command.
The two sides agreed on the importance of
maintaining
continuous military contact and
reviewed the slate
of military-to-military
exchanges for the
remainder of the year.
Both sides also pledged to work
collaboratively to
strengthen global
nonproliferation
and arms control regimes,
and to work to
address security concerns
related to North Korea, Iran,
Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and Sudan.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
11
A Memorandum of Understanding on
Enhancing
Cooperation on Climate Change,
Energy, and the
Environment was signed
during the
meeting.
The United States and China resumed the
bilateral
Nonproliferation Dialogue in
Washington in September
2009, which had
been suspended
following the announcement of
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
in October 2008.
The two sides met
again in December 2009 in
Beijing. These exchanges,
conducted at the
Assistant
Secretary of State level, seek to
strengthen overall
nonproliferation cooperation.
U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG) Commandant Thad
Allen traveled to China
in mid-July 2009,
where he discussed
opportunities to foster
increased
cooperation on civil-maritime issues
with
representatives from the Ministry of
Transport, and
visited the Maritime Police
Academy at Ningbo. The
government of China
is moving quickly
to build up its civil-maritime
capabilities,
particularly in search and rescue,
environmental
protection, port security, and
interdiction. The
USCG is committed to
helping assist and
shape these developments. In
keeping with the
USCG’s interest in
maximizing
professional exchanges designed to
increase mutual
trust and understanding, the
Commandant
proposed to send a small number
of cadets and an
instructor to the Maritime
Police Academy in summer 2010.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
12
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Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
13
Chapter
Two: Understanding China’s
Strategy
OVERVIEW
China does not publish
equivalents to the U.S.
National Security
Strategy, National Defense
Strategy, or National
Military Strategy. Rather,
China uses “white
papers,” speeches, and
articles as the
principal mechanisms to
communicate policy
and strategy publicly. The
transparency of China’s
military and security
affairs has
improved in recent years, including
its biennial
publication of Defense White
Papers and the
2009 launch of an official MND
website. The most
recent Defense White Paper
(2008) summarizes China’s
defense policy as
upholding national
security and unity and
ensuring the
interests of national development;
achieving the
all-round coordinated and
sustainable
development of China’s
national
defense and armed
forces; enhancing the
performance of the
armed forces with
informatization as
the major measuring
criterion;
implementing the military strategy of
active defense;
pursuing a self-defensive
nuclear strategy;
and fostering a security
environment
conducive to China’s
peaceful
development. However,
much more could be
said by China
about its military investments, the
strategy and
intentions shaping those
investment
choices, and the military capabilities
it is developing.
The study of PLA
views on strategy remains an
inexact science,
and outside observers have few
direct insights
into the formal strategies
motivating China’s
force build-up, the
leadership’s
thinking about the use of force, the
contingency
planning that shapes the PLA’s
force structure or
doctrine, or the linkages
between strategic
pronouncements and actual
policy decisions,
especially in crisis situations.
It is possible,
however, to make some
generalizations
about China’s
strategy based on
tradition,
historical pattern, official statements
and papers, and
emphasis on certain military
capabilities and
diplomatic initiatives.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
14
Chairman: Hu Jintao
Vice Chairmen:
Gen Guo Boxiong
Gen Xu Caihou
Members:
Gen Liang Guanglie
Gen Chen Bingde
Gen Li Jinai
Gen Liao Xilong
Gen Chang Wanquan
Gen Jing Zhiyuan
AdmWu Shengli
Gen Xu Qiliang
General Office DIR:
Maj Gen Wang
Guanzhong
PC = Political Commissar
DPC = Deputy PC
CDR = Commander
CMDT =Commandant
DIR = Director
DDIR = Deputy Director
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE
Minister: Gen Liang Guanglie
FAO DIR: Maj Gen Qian Lihua
STATE
COUNCIL
Chief: Gen Chen Bingde
Deputy Chiefs:
Lt Gen Zhang
Qinsheng
Gen Ma Xiaotian
V Adm Sun
Jianguo
Lt Gen Hou Shusen
Assistants to the
Chief:
Maj Gen Qi Jianguo
Maj Gen Chen Yong
DIR: Gen Li Jinai
DDIR:
Gen Liu Zhenqi
Lt Gen Tong Shiping
Lt Gen Jia Ting’an
Lt Gen Du Jincai
Assistants to the
DIR:
Lt Gen Nian Fuchun
Lt Gen Xu Yaoyuan
DIR: Gen Liao Xilong
DDIR:
Lt Gen Ding Jiye
Lt Gen Qin Yinhe
Maj Gen Gu Junshan
PC: Gen Sun Dafa
DPC: Maj Gen Sun Sijing
DIR: Gen Chang Wanquan
DDIR:
Lt Gen Li Andong
Lt Gen Zhu Fazhong
Lt Gen Han Yanlin
Maj Gen Niu Hongguang
Maj Gen Liu Sheng
PC: Gen Chi Wanchun
DPC: Maj Gen Huang Zuoxing
SHENYANG
CDR: Lt Gen Zhang Youxia
PC: Gen Huang Xianzhong
BEIJING
CDR: Lt Gen Fang Fenghui
PC: Maj Gen Liu Fulian
LANZHOU
CDR: Lt Gen Wang Guosheng
PC: Lt Gen Li Changcai
NANJING
CDR: Lt Gen Zhao Keshi
PC: Lt Gen Chen Guoling
CHENGDU
CDR: Lt Gen Li Shiming
PC: Lt Gen TianXiusi
STATE
COUNCIL
JINAN
CDR: Gen Fan Changlong
PC: Gen Liu Dongdong
GUANGZHOU
CDR: Lt Gen Xu Fenlin
PC: Lt Gen Zhang Yang
Ministry of Public
Security
PEOPLE’S ARMED
POLICE
CDR: Lt Gen Wang
Jianping
PC: Gen Yu Linxiang
PLA NAVY
CDR: AdmWu Shengli
PC: V Adm Liu Xiaojiang
PLA AIR FORCE
CDR: Gen Xu Qiliang
PC: Gen Deng Changyou
SECOND ARTILLERY
CORPS
CDR: Gen Jing Zhiyuan
PC: Gen Zhang Haiyang
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY
CMDT: Maj Gen Zhang Yulin
PC: R Adm Xu Yitian
ACADEMY OF MILITARY
SCIENCE
CDMT: Lt Gen Liu Chengjun
PC: Gen Liu Yuan
NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY
CMDT: Lt Gen Wang Xibin
PC: Lt Gen Liu Yazhou
CENTRAL MILITARY
COMMISSION
MILITARY
REGIONS
SERVICE
ARMS
SENIOR COMMAND/
RESEARCH
ACADEMIES
Bold/red text:
Full Member, 17th
Central
Committee
Bold/blue text:
Alternate
Member,
17th Central
Committee
GENERAL STAFF DEPT
GENERAL POLITICAL DEPT GENERAL LOGISTICS DEPT GENERAL ARMAMENTS DEPT
The
PRC Military Structure
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
15
CHINA’S
STRATEGIC PRIORITIES
China’s leaders appear
to make national
decisions based on
a set of strategic priorities,
which include
perpetuating CCP rule,
sustaining
economic growth and development,
maintaining
domestic political stability,
defending China’s
national sovereignty and
territorial
integrity, and securing China’s
status
as a great power.
PRC strategy is one of
maintaining
balance among these, at times,
competing
priorities. China’s
leaders describe
the initial
decades of the 21st century as a
“strategic window
of opportunity,” meaning
that regional and
international conditions will
generally be
conducive to China’s
rise to
regional
preeminence and global influence, and
seek to prolong
that window of opportunity as
much as possible.
China’s leaders have
reaffirmed and continue to
support “reform
and opening,” which began in
1978 as the
fundamental basis for China’s
overall strategy
and policy. However, two
central
perceptions increasingly appear in
senior PRC
leadership statements and
commentary,
suggesting a growing recognition
that the process
of “reform and opening” has
engendered several
contradictions and
challenges:
First, reforms have enabled China to
experience rapid
growth in economic,
political, and
military power, but have also
led to significant
new challenges to internal
stability.
Second, reforms have increasingly
propelled China
into a global security
environment in
which external events can
no longer be
isolated from their effects on
China’s internal
situation, and vice versa.
These dual
perceptions have led Party leaders to
conclude that,
through 2020, they should focus
on managing or
exploiting external tensions,
especially with
the great powers, to maintain an
environment
conducive to China’s
development.
Beijing’s growing economic
stature partly
drives a more
active external posture in which it
demonstrates a
willingness to assert its
interests, while
taking on a more active role in
resolving disputes
and promoting regional
cooperation. In a
significant departure from
prior language, China’s
2008 Defense White
Paper maintains
that:
“China has become an important
member
of the
international system and the future
and destiny of China
have been
increasingly
closely connected with the
international
community. China
cannot
develop in
isolation from the rest of the
world, nor can the
world enjoy prosperity
and stability
without China.”
Nonetheless, there
are forces—some beyond the
control of China’s
leaders—that could reinforce
a relatively
inward focus, or that could divert
China from a peaceful
pathway:
Nationalism: Communist Party leaders
continue to rely
on nationalism, based on
China’s economic
achievements and
increased
international profile, to improve
the legitimacy of
the Party. However, this
approach contains
risks. Although China’s
leaders have
stoked patriotic sentiment to
manipulate public
opinion and deflect
domestic criticism
of the CCP, they are
aware that these
forces can be difficult to
control once begun
and could easily turn
against the state.
Economics: Continued economic
development
remains the foundation of the
Party’s popular
legitimacy and underwrites
its military
power. Unexpected increases in
resource demand,
global resource shortages
or price shocks,
or restricted access to
resources, could
affect China’s
strategic
outlook and
behavior, and might force its
leadership to
re-examine its resource
allocation
priorities, including those for the
military.
Domestic Political Pressures: Regime
survival and the
maintenance of CCP rule
shape the
strategic outlook of China’s
leaders and drive
many of their choices.
The Communist
Party continues to face
long-term popular
demands for improved
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
16
government
responsiveness, transparency
and
accountability, which weakens its
legitimacy.
Demographic Pressures: Demographic
stresses will
increase in the future, creating
a structural
constraint on China’s
ability to
sustain high
growth rates.
Environment: China’s economic
development has come
at a significant
environmental cost
and China’s
leaders are
concerned that
these problems could
undermine regime
legitimacy by threatening
economic
development, public health, social
stability, and China’s
international image.
Cross-Strait Dynamics: Despite a
reduction
in tensions
following the March 2008
election of Taiwan
President Ma Ying-jeou,
the possibility of
a military conflict with
Taiwan and U.S.
military intervention
remain the PLA’s
most pressing long-term
military concerns.
A potential cross-Strait
conflict will
drive China’s
military
modernization as
long as China’s
leaders
judge that the
permanent loss of Taiwan
could seriously
undermine the regime’s
political
legitimacy and hold on power.
Regional Concerns: With China’s
proximity and involvement
in many of the
world’s “flashpoints”
(e.g., North Korea,
the Spratly
Islands, the Senkaku
Islands,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan), China’s leaders
hope to prevent
regional instability from
spilling across China’s
borders and thereby
interfering with
economic development or
domestic
stability. Changes in regional
security dynamics—such
as perceived
threats to China’s
ability to access and
transport foreign
resources, or disruptions
on the Korean Peninsula—could lead to
shifts in China’s
military development and
deployment
patterns, likely with
consequences for
neighboring states.
China’s
Disputed Territories. Although not exhaustive,
three of China’s
major ongoing territorial
disputes
are based on claims along its shared border with India and Bhutan,
the South China Sea,
and
with Japan in the East China Sea.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
17
China’s Territorial
Disputes
China’s use of force in
territorial disputes has varied widely throughout history. Some
disputes led to
war, such as China’s
border conflicts with India
in 1962 and Vietnam
in 1979.
A contested border
with the former Soviet Union during the
1960s raised the possibility of
nuclear war. In
more recent cases, China
has been willing to compromise with and even
offer concessions
to its neighbors. Since 1998, China has settled eleven land
territorial
disputes with six
of its neighbors. Several disputes continue over EEZs and ownership of
potentially rich,
off-shore oil and gas deposits.
The East China Sea contains approximately 7 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas and up to 100
billion barrels of
oil. Japan
maintains that an equidistant line from each country involved
should separate
the EEZs, while China
claims an Extended Continental Shelf beyond the
equidistant line
to the Okinawa Trench (which almost reaches Japan’s shore). In early
2009,
Japan accused China
of violating a June 2008 agreement providing for joint exploration of
oil and natural
gas fields, and claimed that China unilaterally drilled
beneath the demarcation
line and extracted
reserves from the Japanese side. China
and Japan
continue to dispute
possession of the
nearby Senkaku
Islands. However,
both sides have said that this dispute
should not
undermine their overall relationship.
The South China
Sea plays an important role in Northeast Asia and Southeast
Asia security
considerations. Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil
and commerce through South
China Sea shipping
lanes, including 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan. China
claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel island groups—claims
disputed in whole
or part by Brunei, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia,
and Vietnam.
Taiwan, which occupies
Itu Aba in the Spratly
Islands, also
claims all four island groups in
the South China Sea. In 2009, China protested claims made by Malaysia and Vietnam and
reiterated it has “indisputable
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea
and the
adjacent waters
and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as
well
as the seabed and
subsoil thereof.”
Despite increased
political and economic relations over the years between China and India,
tensions remain
along their shared 4,057 km border, most notably over Arunachal Pradesh,
which China asserts is part of Tibet and therefore of China, and over the Askai
Chin region
at the western end
of the Tibetan Plateau. Both countries in 2009 stepped up efforts to
assert
their claims. China tried to block a $2.9 billion loan
to India
from the Asian Development
Bank, claiming
part of the loan would have been used for water projects in Arunachal
Pradesh. This
represented the first time China sought to influence
this dispute through a
multilateral
institution. The then governor of Arunachal Pradesh announced that India
would
deploy more troops
and fighter jets to the area. An Indian academic also noted that in 2008,
the Indian
military had recorded 270 border violations and nearly 2,300 cases of “aggressive
border patrolling”
by Chinese soldiers.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
18
DEBATES
ON FUTURE STRATEGY
Chinese State
Councilor Dai Bingguo in July
2009 defined China’s
“core interests” as
safeguarding the
basic system and national
security, national
sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and
sustained and stable economic
and social
development. China’s
current
strategy remains
one of managing the external
environment to
ensure conditions are conducive
to its own
economic development. This
strategy appears
to be accepted widely by
Beijing’s foreign and
security policy
establishment. However,
differences of opinion
within China
occasionally surface, particularly
in academic
circles, about how China
can
achieve these
goals and how it can best do so
over time without
conflict with its neighbors or
the United States.
Some prefer the
traditional guidance provided
by former
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping in
the early 1990s: “observe
calmly; secure our
position; cope
with affairs calmly; hide our
capabilities and
bide our time; be good at
maintaining a low
profile; and never claim
leadership.” This
guidance reflected Deng’s
belief that PRC
foreign policy and security
strategy had to
reinforce its core national
interest of
promoting domestic development by
denying ambition,
and avoiding any pretense of
leadership while
deflecting those who would
encourage China
to play a more active and
constructive role
in addressing regional and
international
problems. However, another
group believes
that this more limited approach
is untenable as China’s
power grows. This
group asserts that
China
should actively
cooperate with
regional actors and the United
States to increase
China’s
influence and to
assure neighbors
and more distant great powers
that China’s
rise will not pose a destabilizing
threat to their
security. Still others believe that
China needs to be
tougher and more assertive in
protecting its
interests by countering perceived
efforts by the United States to constrain China
or its influence
in relation to actors such as
Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and others in
Southeast
Asia.
There has also
been an active debate among
military and
civilian theorists in China
about
what new
capabilities the PLA should develop
to protect and
advance China’s
interests beyond
the traditional
requirements to protect China
from attack or
coercion, deter Taiwan
independence or
influence Taiwan
to settle the
dispute on Beijing’s terms, and defend China’s
claims to disputed
territories in the South China
Sea and elsewhere.
Some senior officers and
civilian theorists
advocate a major expansion of
the PLA’s power
projection capabilities, while
others urge a more
modest increase in its
capacity for
international peacekeeping,
humanitarian
assistance, disaster relief, and
protection of the
sea lanes. The extent to which
these
considerations shape China’s
current
defense policy and
force planning is not known.
However, it is
increasingly apparent that these
concerns influence
China’s
thinking about
defense planning.
THE
NEW HISTORIC MISSIONS
China’s leaders
established baseline missions
for the armed forces
in 2004, officially titled the
Historic Missions
of the Armed Forces in the
New Period of the
New Century (xin shiji xin
jieduan wojun
lishi shiming—
新世纪新阶段我军历史使命).
These
“new
historic missions”
focus primarily on
adjustments in the
PRC leadership’s assessment
of the
international security environment and
expanding
definition of national security.
These missions
were further codified in a 2007
amendment to the
CCP Constitution. The
missions, as
currently defined, include:
Provide an important guarantee of strength
for the party to
consolidate its ruling
position.
Provide a strong security guarantee for
safeguarding the
period of strategic
opportunity for
national development.
Provide a powerful strategic support for
safeguarding
national interests.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 19
Play an important role in safeguarding
world peace and
promoting common
development.
According to
official writings, the driving
factors behind the
articulation of these missions
were: changes in China’s
security situation,
challenges and
priorities regarding China’s
national
development, and a desire to realign
the tasks of the
PLA with the CCP’s objectives.
Politburo member
and CMC Vice Chairman Xu
Caihou in 2005
asserted “the historic missions
embody the new
requirements imposed on the
military by the
Party’s historic tasks,
accommodate new
changes in our national
development
strategy, and conform to the new
trends in global
military development.”
The 2008 Defense
White Paper stated that the
PLA had been
directed to “integrate efforts to
enrich the country
and strengthen the military,”
“perform its new
historic missions,” and “boost
innovation in
military theory, technology,
organization, and
management.”
Although economic
development remains
China’s central task, China’s
leaders clearly
intend national
defense to be coordinated with
economic growth to
enable development.
President Hu Jintao’s strategic guidance to
the military
reflects this view, calling on the
military to play a
broader role in securing
China’s strategic
interests, including those
beyond its
territorial boundaries.
In a March 2009
speech to military delegates to
China’s National People’s
Congress, President
Hu urged the
military to concentrate on
“building core
military capabilities,” but also
“the ability to
carry out military operations
other than war” (fei
zhanzheng junshi
xingdong—非战争军事行动). Hu also
maintained, “with
the prerequisite of
satisfactorily
completing all missions—taking
preparation for
military struggle as the lead—
the armed forces
must participate actively in
and support
national economic construction and
public welfare.”
Authoritative PRC
media describes these
“operations other
than war” as including:
counterterrorism,
maintaining social stability,
disaster relief
and rescue, and international
peacekeeping
operations. China’s
leaders have
mentioned other “non-war
military” activities
including
protecting sea lanes, cyber warfare,
security of
space-based assets, conducting
military
diplomacy, and preparing for
unexpected
conditions and events.
The 2009 PLA Navy deployment to conduct
counter-piracy
escort missions in the Gulf
of Aden is one example of China’s pursuit
of its new
historic missions.
Another example was the December 2008
launch of China’s
first large hospital ship.
The ship is able
to support combat
operations, but
PRC official press reporting
stresses the
humanitarian aspects of the
ship’s mission.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 20
Military and
Security Aspects of Beijing’s
Regional Energy Strategy
China’s engagement,
investment, and foreign construction related to energy continue to grow.
Beijing has constructed
or invested in energy projects in more than 50 countries, spanning
nearly every
continent. The majority of China’s external energy
related projects and
investment since
2003 remains linked to securing long-term energy resources (primarily oil
and gas) to
sustain economic and industrial development. Beijing’s goal for oil and gas
development
projects is to provide China
with direct access to and control of extracted crude
oil and natural
gas. In addition to increasing imports, Beijing is also seeking to ensure
supply
from as many producers
and through as many transport options as possible. Although energy
independence is no
longer an option for China,
Beijing
still seeks to maintain a supply chain
less susceptible
to disruption from outside factors.
In 2008, China
imported 56 percent of its oil and conservative
estimates of
future oil consumption project that China will import
almost two-thirds
of its oil by 2015 and four-fifths by 2030. Oil
currently
contributes about 20% to national energy consumption;
China meets about 70%
of its total energy needs through coal.
Analysis of PRC
crude oil imports since 2000 shows only minor
variations in
sources of crude oil imports. Beijing
will therefore
likely continue to
look to the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, Africa,
and North America to satisfy its growing demand for
oil.
A second part of Beijing’s foreign
energy strategy is the
development of
land-based pipeline corridors that avoid sensitive
Sea Lines of
Communication (SLOCs) such as the Strait of
Malacca. In 2008,
over 80 percent of China’s
oil imports
transited the Strait of Malacca. In 2006, a crude oil pipeline
designed to
deliver 200,000 barrels per day (b/d) of crude oil from Kazakhstan to China
became
operational. A project to expand the capacity to 400,000 b/d is nearing
completion
with future plans
to increase capacity to 800,000 b/d. In May 2009, construction began on a
300,000 b/d spur
pipeline from Siberia to Daqing. Another
proposed pipeline would transport
400,000 b/d of
crude oil from Kyuakpya, Burma, to Kunming, China,
bypassing the Strait of
Malacca.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 21
However,
evaluation of proven global oil reserves indicates that China’s
future energy needs
can only be met
through suppliers in the Persian Gulf, Africa, and North
America—all
extraction points
that will continue to require maritime transport. Pipeline projects, for
example, will do
little to minimize Beijing’s vulnerability
in the Strait of Hormuz, through
which 40 percent
of China’s
crude oil imports transited in 2008—and this percentage is
expected to rise.
The sheer volume of oil and liquefied natural gas imports to China
from the
Middle East will
make strategic SLOCs increasingly important to Beijing, and even if all
pipeline projects
are completed on time and at designed capacity, the effect on China’s
hydrocarbon
security will be minimal.
China’s
import transit routes/critical chokepoints and proposed/under
construction SLOC bypass routes.
Although China currently has no international
natural gas pipeline connection, Beijing
is
financing a
pipeline that will deliver up to 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural
gas per
year from Turkmenistan to China
across Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Project construction
started in the
summer of 2007. There are also proposals to build natural gas pipelines
from
Russia and Burma that would deliver 68 and 12 bcm per
year, respectively, to China.
Beijing
is also urging Moscow to build a gas pipeline from Sakhalin Island
to China
that would
transport an
undetermined amount of gas to northeast China.
With these
projects, China
has become a major economic contributor in several states.
However, Beijing has not
used oil as a foreign policy lever on the international stage. This is
because China
remains dependent on oil to support its own industrial and economic
development, which
makes it a less attractive foreign policy tool. The increasing presence
of
Chinese oil
companies around the world nevertheless cannot be discounted as a future
tool of
Beijing’s influence.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 22
CHINA’S
MILITARY STRATEGY
PLA theorists have
developed a framework for
doctrine-driven
reform with the long-term goal
of building a
force capable of fighting and
winning “local
wars under conditions of
informatization.”
Drawing upon foreign
military
experiences, particularly U.S.-led
campaigns up to, and
including, Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM
and Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, Soviet
and Russian military
theory, and the
PLA’s own combat history,
China is transforming
across the whole of its
armed forces.
The pace and scale
of these reforms are broad
and sweeping.
However, the PLA remains
untested in modern
combat. This lack of
operational
experience continues to complicate
outside assessment
of the progress of China’s
military
transformation. The same applies to
China’s internal
assessments of its own military
capabilities, for
which China’s
civilian leaders
must rely upon the
advice of commanders
lacking direct
experience in modern combat or
upon “scientific”
combat models divorced from
the realities of
the modern battlefield.
Analysis of
authoritative speeches and
documents suggests
China
relies on a body of
overall principles
and guidance known as the
“National Military
Strategic Guidelines for the
New Period” (xin
shiqi guojia junshi zhanlüe
fangzhen—新时期国家军事战略方針) to plan
and manage the
development and use of the
armed forces.
Academic research
suggests that the current
Guidelines most
likely date to 1993, reflecting
the impact of the
1991 Persian Gulf War and
the collapse of
the Soviet Union on PRC
military-strategic
thinking, with
“enhancements” in
2002 and 2004. The latter
revisions likely
reflect China’s
perceptions of
its security
environment and the character of
modern war,
integrate lessons learned from
China’s military
modernization, and emphasize
building forces to
win “local wars under
conditions of
informatization.”
According to the
2008 Defense White Paper,
these Guidelines
emphasize fighting and
winning local wars
under conditions of
informatization
and building toward integrated
joint operations,
with a stress on asymmetric
warfare—“make the
best use of our strong
points to attack
the enemy’s weak points.”
Citing the need to
ensure “close coordination
between military
struggle and political,
diplomatic,
economic, cultural, and legal
endeavors,” the
Guidelines also emphasize the
importance of
integrating multiple instruments
of state power to
ensure deterrence and prevent
conflict.
The operational,
or “active defense,” (jiji
fangyu—积极防御) component of the
Guidelines posits
a defensive military strategy
in which China
does not initiate wars or fight
wars of
aggression, but engages in war only to
defend national
sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
Naval
Warfare. The naval component of
“active defense”
is termed “Offshore Active
Defense.” The 2008
Defense White Paper
describes the PLA
Navy as a strategic service,
developing the
capability to operate in “distant
waters.” The PLA
Navy has three main
missions: resist
seaborne aggression, protect
national
sovereignty, and safeguard maritime
rights. PLA Navy
doctrine for maritime
operations focuses
on six offensive and
defensive
campaigns: blockade, anti-sea lines
of communication,
maritime-land attack, antiship,
maritime
transportation protection, and
naval base
defense.
PRC President Hu
Jintao called China
a “sea
power” and
advocated a “powerful people’s
navy” to “uphold
our maritime rights and
interests” during
a 2006 speech at a Navy CCP
Congress. Other
civilian leaders, PLA Navy
officials,
government writings, and PLA
journals have
argued that China’s
economic and
political power is
contingent upon access to and
use of the sea,
and that a strong navy is required
to safeguard such
access. Despite increased
consideration of
missions farther from China,
the Navy’s primary
focus will remain on
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 23
preparing for
operations within the “first and
second island
chains” (see map), with emphasis
on a potential
conflict with U.S.
forces over
Taiwan. This is likely
to remain true until there
is a resolution of
the Taiwan
issue on terms
Beijing finds acceptable.
The
First and Second
Island Chains. PRC
military theorists conceive of two island “chains” as forming a
geographic
basis for China’s
maritime defensive perimeter.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 24
Ground
Warfare. Under “active defense,”
ground forces are
tasked with defending
China’s borders,
ensuring domestic stability,
and exercising
regional power projection. PLA
ground forces are
transitioning from a static
defensive force
allocated across seven internal
MRs—oriented for
positional, mobile, urban,
and mountain
offensive campaigns; coastal
defense campaigns;
and landing campaigns—to
a more offensive
and maneuver-oriented force
organized and
equipped for operations along
China’s periphery.
The 2008 Defense
White Paper describes the
ground forces as
moving from “regional
defense to
trans-regional mobility.” It states
that ground forces
reforms are aimed
principally at
making units “small, modular,
and
multi-functional” and at increasing
capabilities for “air-ground
integrated
operations,
long-distance maneuvers, rapid
assault, and
special operations.” PLA ground
force reforms are
modeled on Russian doctrine
and U.S.
military tactics. The ground forces
appear to be
leading the PLA’s effort to
experiment with ad
hoc, multi-service, joint
tactical
formations to execute integrated joint
operations. In
August and September 2009,
more than 50,000
troops from four separate
military regions
participated in the PLA’s first
ever large scale
national mobility exercise,
Kuayue (Stride)
2009.
Offense as Defense
The history of
modern Chinese warfare provides numerous case studies in which China’s
leaders have
claimed military preemption as a strategically defensive act. For
example, China
refers to its
intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953) as the “War to Resist the United States
and Aid Korea.”
Similarly, authoritative texts refer to border conflicts against India (1962),
the
Soviet Union
(1969), and Vietnam
(1979) as “Self-Defense Counter Attacks.”
Chinese
strategic-level military theory establishes seemingly contradictory
guidance: “strike
only after the
enemy has struck,” and “seize the initiative.” Of note, China’s
2008 Defense
White Paper
features a slightly different construction:
“Strategically,
[the PLA] adheres to the principle of…striking and getting the better of
the
enemy only
after the enemy has started an attack [emphasis added].”
Yet, the
authoritative work, Science of Military Strategy, makes it clear
that the definition of an
enemy strike is
not limited to conventional, kinetic military operations. Rather, an
enemy
“strike” may also
be defined in political terms. Thus:
“Striking only after
the enemy has struck does not mean waiting for the enemy’s strike
passively.… It
doesn’t mean to give up the ‘advantageous chances’ in campaign or
tactical
operations, for
the ‘first shot’ on the plane of politics must be differentiated from the
‘first shot’ on
that of tactics.
[This section
continues] if any country or organization violates the other country’s
sovereignty and
territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to ‘fire the
first
shot’ on the plane
of tactics [emphasis added].”
These passages
illustrate the ambiguity of PRC strategic thinking, as well as the
justification for
offensive—or
preemptive—military action at the operational and tactical level under
the guise
of a defensive
posture at the strategic level.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 25
Air
Warfare. The PLAAF continues its
conversion from a
force for limited territorial
defense to a more
flexible and agile force able
to operate
off-shore in both offensive and
defensive roles,
using the U.S.
and Russian air
forces as models. Mission focus areas include:
strike, air and
missile defense, early warning
and
reconnaissance, and strategic mobility. The
PLAAF also has a
leading role in the “Joint
Anti-Air Raid”
campaign, which appears to
form the basis for
much of China’s
planning for
anti-access and
area-denial operations.
Underscoring the
ambiguity of offense and
defense in PLA
theory, the Joint Anti-Air Raid
campaign is
strategically defensive in nature,
but at the
operational and tactical levels, it calls
for attacks
against adversaries’ bases and naval
forces.
The PLA’s new
missions are also driving
discussions about
the future of the PLAAF,
where a general
consensus has emerged that
protecting China’s
global interests requires an
increase in the
PLAAF’s long-range
transportation and
logistics capabilities. There
appears to be
little public discussion about
requirements to
project combat air power far
from China. As
with the Navy, it is likely that
the Air Force’s
primary focus for the coming
decade will remain
on building the capabilities
required to pose a
credible military threat to
Taiwan and U.S. forces in East
Asia, deter
Taiwan independence, or
influence Taiwan
to
settle the dispute
on Beijing’s
terms.
Space
Warfare. PLA strategists see space as
central to
enabling modern informatized
warfare, but PLA
doctrine does not appear to
contemplate space
operations as an operational
“campaign” on its
own; rather, space operations
form an integral
component of all campaigns.
The PLA’s military
theoretical journal China
Military Science argues that “it is
in space that
information age
warfare will come into its more
intensive points.”
Specifically, space-based
communications,
intelligence, and navigational
systems are
important to enable and coordinate
joint operations
and win modern wars.
Accordingly, the
PLA is acquiring technologies
to improve China’s
space capabilities. A PLA
analysis of U.S. and
Coalition military
operations reinforced
the importance of
operations in
space to enable informatized
warfare, claiming
that “space is the
commanding point
for the information
battlefield. Battlefield
monitor and control,
information
communications, navigation and
position, and
precision guidance all rely on
satellites and
other sensors.”
Concurrently,
China is developing the ability to
attack an
adversary’s space assets, accelerating
the militarization
of space. PLA writings
emphasize the
necessity of “destroying,
damaging, and
interfering with the enemy’s
reconnaissance ...
and communications
satellites,”
suggesting that such systems, as well
as navigation and
early warning satellites, could
be among initial
targets of attack to “blind and
deafen the enemy.”
The same PLA analysis of
U.S. and Coalition
military operations also
states that “destroying
or capturing satellites
and other sensors …
will deprive the opponents
of initiatives on
the battlefield and [make it
difficult] for
them to bring their precision
guided weapons
into full play.”
Integrated
Network Electronic Warfare.
PRC military
writings highlight the seizure of
electromagnetic
dominance in the early phases
of a campaign as
among the foremost tasks to
ensure battlefield
success. PLA theorists have
coined the term “integrated
network electronic
warfare” (wangdian
yitizhan—网电一体战) to
describe the use
of electronic warfare, computer
network
operations, and kinetic strikes to
disrupt
battlefield information systems that
support an
adversary’s warfighting and power
projection capabilities.
PLA writings on future
models of joint
operations identify “integrated
network electronic
warfare” as one of the basic
forms of “integrated
joint operations,”
suggesting the
centrality of seizing and
dominating the
electromagnetic spectrum in
PLA campaign
theory.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 26
SECRECY
AND DECEPTION IN PLA
MILITARY
STRATEGY
PRC military
writings point to a working
definition of
strategic deception as “[luring] the
other side into
developing misperceptions …
and [establishing
for oneself] a strategically
advantageous
position by producing various
kinds of false
phenomena in an organized and
planned manner
with the smallest cost in
manpower and
materials.” In addition to
information
operations and conventional
camouflage,
concealment, and denial, the PLA
draws from China’s
historical experience and
the traditional
role that stratagem and deception
have played in
Chinese statecraft.
There is an
inherent tension in Chinese strategic
culture today,
pitting a deep-seated tendency to
conceal military
capabilities and force
development plans
against a partial acceptance
that too much
secrecy tends to inflame regional
and global anxiety
about China’s rising power.
For over a decade PRC
leaders have identified
this “China threat
theory” as a serious hazard to
the country’s
international standing, threatening
the development of
a persistent alignment of
regional and
global powers in opposition to
China. In
addition, extreme secrecy is
increasingly
difficult to reconcile with China’s
role in the
integrated global economy, which
depends upon
transparency and the free flow of
information for
success.
“Three Warfares”
In 2003, the CCP
Central Committee and the CMC approved the concept of “Three Warfares”
(san zhong
zhanfa—三种战法), a PLA information warfare concept aimed
at influencing the
psychological
dimensions of military activity:
Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine
an enemy’s ability to conduct combat
operations through
psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing
enemy military
personnel and supporting civilian populations.
Media Warfare is aimed at influencing
domestic and international public opinion to build
public and international
support for China’s military actions and to dissuade an adversary
from pursuing
policies perceived to be adverse to China’s interests.
Legal Warfare uses international and
domestic laws to gain international support and
manage possible
political repercussions of China’s military actions.
The concept of the
“Three Warfares” is being developed for use in conjunction with other
military and
non-military operations. For example, China has incorporated the concept
of Legal
Warfare into its
attempts to shape international opinion and interpretation of
international law.
An overwhelming
majority of nations throughout the world, including the United States,
believe
that customary
international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS),
effectively balances the resource-related sovereign rights of littoral
states in their
EEZ with the
freedoms of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful
uses of the
sea of other
nations. This majority view is based upon a sound reading of the
negotiating history
of UNCLOS, the
actual text of UNCLOS itself, and decades of state practice. The PRC,
however, appears
to be making concerted efforts, through enacting domestic legislation
inconsistent with
international law, misreading the negotiations and text of UNCLOS, and
overlooking
decades of state practice in attempts to justify a minority
interpretation providing
greater authority
by littoral states over activities within the EEZ.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 27
ASYMMETRIC
WARFIGHTING
Since the 1991
Persian Gulf War and Operation
ALLIED FORCE
(1999), PLA strategists have
emphasized the
urgency of building force
structure,
strategies, and tactics around new or
unexpected
capabilities. They also have
emphasized
developing innovative strategies
and tactics to
employ with existing technologies
and weapon systems
to level the playing field
against
technologically superior opponents. An
article published
in the Liberation Army Daily
in 1999 posits:
“[A] strong enemy
with absolute
superiority is
certainly not without
weakness…. [Our]
military preparations
need to be more
directly aimed at finding
tactics to exploit
the weaknesses of a
strong enemy.”
There are a number
of areas where the PLA has
adopted approaches
to operational requirements
that differ
significantly from U.S. approaches to
the same
requirement. Examples include the
heavy reliance on
ballistic and cruise missiles,
rather than
stealth aircraft, to attack ground
targets inside
heavily defended airspace; an
array of systems
to attack intelligence,
communications,
and navigation satellites,
seeking to
neutralize the U.S. advantage in
space; an approach
to computer network
exploitation that
harvests huge volumes of data;
an emphasis on
offensive and defensive
electronic warfare
in recent years; and the
“three warfares”
doctrine.
Military
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Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 29
Chapter
Three: Force Modernization Goals and Trends
OVERVIEW
China’s leaders
have stated their intentions and
allocated
resources to pursue broad-based
military
transformation that encompasses forcewide
professionalization;
improved training;
more robust,
realistic joint exercises; and
accelerated
acquisition and development of
modern
conventional and nuclear weapons. It
appears that China’s
military continues to focus
on assuring the
capability to deter moves
toward Taiwan
independence, or to influence
Taiwan to settle
the dispute on Beijing’s terms,
if Beijing were to
decide to adopt such an
approach.
While remaining
focused on Taiwan as a
primary mission,
China will, by 2020, lay the
foundation for a
force able to accomplish
broader regional
and global objectives. By the
latter half of
this decade, it is likely that China
will be able to
project and sustain a modest
sized force—perhaps
several battalions of
ground forces or a
naval flotilla of up to a dozen
ships—in
low-intensity operations far from
China. It is
unlikely, however, that China will
be able to project
and sustain large forces in
high-intensity
combat operations far from
China until well
into the following decade.
Despite
significant improvements, the PLA
continues to face
deficiencies in inter-service
cooperation and
actual experience in joint
exercises and
combat operations. Recognizing
these
shortcomings, China’s leaders continue to
stress asymmetric
strategies to leverage China’s
advantages while
exploiting the perceived
vulnerabilities of
potential opponents.
ANTI-ACCESS/AREA-DENIAL
CAPABILITIES
As part of its
planning for a Taiwan
contingency, China
continues to develop
measures to deter
or counter third-party
intervention,
including by the United States, in
any future
cross-Strait crisis. China’s approach
to dealing with
this challenge is manifest in a
sustained effort
to develop the capability to
attack, at long
ranges, military forces that might
deploy or operate
within the western Pacific,
which the
Department of Defense characterizes
as “anti-access”
and “area denial” capabilities,
respectively.
China is pursuing a variety of air,
sea, undersea,
space and counterspace, and
information
warfare systems and operational
concepts to
achieve this capability, moving
toward an array of
overlapping, multilayered
offensive
capabilities extending from China’s
coast into the
western Pacific. China’s 2008
Defense White
Paper asserts, for example, that
one of the
priorities for the development of
China’s armed
forces is to “increase the
country’s
capabilities to maintain maritime,
space and
electromagnetic space security.”
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 30
An essential
element, if not a fundamental
prerequisite, of
China’s emerging antiaccess/
area-denial regime
is the ability to
control and
dominate the information spectrum
in all dimensions
of the modern battlespace.
PLA authors often
cite the need in modern
warfare to control
information, sometimes
termed “information
blockade” or “information
dominance,” and to
seize the initiative and gain
an information
advantage in the early phases of
a campaign to
achieve air and sea superiority.
China is improving
information and operational
security to
protect its own information
structures, and is
also developing electronic and
information
warfare capabilities, including
denial and
deception, to defeat those of its
adversaries. China’s
“information blockade”
likely envisions
employment of military and
non-military
instruments of state power across
the battlespace,
including in cyberspace and
outer space. China’s
investments in advanced
electronic warfare
systems, counter-space
weapons, and
computer network operations—
combined with more
traditional forms of
control
historically associated with the PLA and
CCP systems, such
as propaganda and denial
through opacity,
reflect the emphasis and
priority China’s
leaders place on building
capability for
information advantage.
In more
traditional domains, China’s antiaccess/
area-denial focus
appears oriented
toward restricting
or controlling access to
China’s periphery,
including the western
Pacific. China’s
current and projected force
structure
improvements, for example, will
provide the PLA
with systems that can engage
adversary surface
ships up to 1,000 nautical
miles from the PRC
coast. These include:
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles: MRBMs
designed to target
forces at sea, combined
with overhead and
over-the-horizon
targeting systems
to locate and track
moving ships.
Conventional and nuclear-powered attack
submarines: KILO,
SONG, YUAN, and
SHANG attack
submarines capable of firing
advanced ASCMs.
Surface Combatants: LUYANG I/II,
SOVREMENNYY-II,
guided missile
destroyers with
advanced long-range antiair
and anti-ship
missiles.
Missile
Flight Trajectory with Terminal Guidance. This
graphic of an anti-ship ballistic missile’s use of midcourse
and
terminal guidance to strike an aircraft carrier appeared in a 2006
article from the Second Artillery
Engineering
College.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 31
Maritime Strike Aircraft: FB-7 and FB-7A
and the SU-30 MK2,
armed with ASCMs to
engage surface
combatants.
Similarly, current
and projected systems will
allow the PLA to
strike regional air bases,
logistical
facilities, and other ground-based
infrastructure.
PRC military analysts have
concluded that
logistics and power projection
are potential
vulnerabilities in modern warfare,
given the
requirements for precision in
coordinating
transportation, communications,
and logistics
networks. China is fielding an
array of
conventionally armed ballistic missiles,
ground- and
air-launched land-attack cruise
missiles, special
operations forces, and cyberwarfare
capabilities to
hold targets at risk
throughout the
region.
Building
Capacity for Conventional Precision Strike
Short-Range
Ballistic Missiles (< 1,000 km). As of December 2009, the PLA
had somewhere
between
1,050-1,150 SRBMs, increasing its inventory at a slower rate than in past
years. The
oldest of these,
fielded in the 1990s, do not possess true “precision strike” capability,
but later
versions have
greater ranges, improved accuracy, and a variety of conventional
payloads,
including unitary
and submunition warheads.
Medium-Range
Ballistic Missiles (1,000-3,000 km). The PLA is acquiring
conventional
MRBMs to increase
the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets
and
naval ships,
including aircraft carriers, operating far from China’s shores out to the
first island
chain.
Land-Attack Cruise
Missiles. The PLA is developing air- and ground-launched LACMs, such
as the YJ-63,
KD-88 and DH-10 systems for stand-off, precision strikes. As of December
2009
the PLA had
200-500 DH-10 ground-launched cruise missiles.
Ground Attack
Munitions. The PLA Air Force has a small number of tactical air-to-surface
missiles as well
as precision-guided munitions including all-weather, satellite-guided
bombs,
anti-radiation
missiles, and laser-guided bombs.
Anti-Ship Cruise
Missiles. The PLA Navy has or is acquiring nearly a dozen ASCM variants,
ranging from the
1950s-era CSS-N-2 to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22 and SS-N-27B.
The pace of ASCM
research, development and production within China and procurement from
abroad—primarily
Russia—has accelerated over the past decade.
Anti-Radiation
Weapons. The PLA has imported Israeli-made HARPY unmanned combat
aerial vehicles
(UCAVs) and Russian-made anti-radiation missiles. China continues
development on the
Russian Kh-31P (AS-17) known as the YJ-91 and is starting to integrate
this system into
its fighter-bomber force.
Artillery-Delivered
High Precision Munitions. The PLA is developing or
deploying artillery
systems with the
range to strike targets within or even across the Taiwan Strait,
including the A-
100 300 mm
multiple-rocket launcher (MRL) (100+ km range) and the WS-2 400 mm MRL
(200 km range).
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 32
Conventional
Anti-Access Capabilities. The PLA’s
conventional forces are currently capable of striking targets
well
beyond China’s immediate periphery. Not included are ranges for naval
surface- and sub-surface-based
weapons,
whose employment at distances from China would be determined by doctrine
and the scenario in which
they
are employed.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 33
The air and air
defense component of antiaccess/
area-denial
includes long-range
advanced SAMs such
as the Russian SA-10 and
SA-20 PMU1/PMU2 as
well as the indigenous
HQ-9. Beijing will
also use Russian-built and
indigenously
produced fourth-generation
aircraft (e.g.,
Su-27 and Su-30 variants, and the
indigenous F-10
multi-role fighter) to compete
for local air
dominance. The PLA Navy would
employ Russian
Su-30MK2 fighters, armed
with AS-17/Kh-31A
anti-ship missiles, and FB-
7 fighter-bombers
for maritime interdiction.
Acquisition of an
air refueling platform like the
Russian IL-78
would extend operational ranges
for PLAAF and PLA
Navy strike aircraft armed
with precision
munitions, thereby increasing the
threat to surface
and air forces, bases, and
logistics nodes
distant from China’s coast.
Additionally,
acquisition and development of
longer-range UAVs
and UCAVs, including the
Israeli HARPY,
expands China’s options for
long-range
reconnaissance and strike.
China’s existing
long-range advanced SAM
inventory has
limited protection capability
against ballistic
missiles, and yet advertises a
capability against
cruise missiles. The Russian
SA-10 and SA-20
PMU1/PMU2 make up the
bulk of this
capability. The SA-10 was
originally
designed to counter low-flying cruise
missiles, and the
capability has only been
enhanced in the
later model SA-20 systems.
The SA-20 PMU2,
the most advanced SAM
Russia offers for
export, also has the advertised
capability to
engage ballistic missiles with
ranges of 1000km
and speeds of 2800 m/s.
China’s HQ-9
long-range SAM system is also
advertised
(through its export variant FD-2000)
to protect against
low-altitude cruise missiles
and is expected to
have a limited capability to
provide point
defense against tactical ballistic
missiles with
ranges up to 500 km. China is
proceeding with
the research and development
of a missile
defense “umbrella” consisting of
kinetic energy
intercept at exo-atmospheric
altitudes (>80
km), as well as intercepts of
ballistic missiles
and other aerospace vehicles
within the upper
atmosphere.
EXTENDED
OPERATIONAL REACH
In addition to
preparing for a Taiwan
contingency, the
PLA has been developing new
platforms and
capabilities that will extend its
operational reach
to address other concerns
within the East
and South China Seas, and
possibly to the
Indian Ocean and beyond the
second island
chain in the western Pacific.
In describing the
modernization tasks for each
of the service
arms, the 2008 Defense White
Paper places
emphasis on acquiring a capability
to operate with
great mobility and distance from
China’s mainland.
The main avenues for the
PLA to realize
this capability are through its
naval, ballistic
missile, and air forces.
The PLA Navy: The PLA Navy is at
the
forefront of
efforts to extend operational reach
beyond China’s
regional waters. The PLA
Navy’s investment
in platforms such as nuclearpowered
submarines and
progress toward its
first aircraft
carrier (a refurbished ex-Russian
Kuznetsov-class
carrier) suggest China is
seeking to support
additional missions beyond a
Taiwan
contingency. The PLA Navy has also
demonstrated the
capability to conduct limited
deployments of
modern surface platforms
outside the second
island chain, including four
separate
deployments to the Gulf of Aden to
support
counter-piracy operations as of
December 2009. The
PLA Navy also has
acquired new
classes of ships capable of
supporting
conventional military operations, as
well as
humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief missions,
including the Type 071 landing
platform dock
amphibious ship and the Type
920 hospital ship.
Second Artillery
Corps: As detailed
elsewhere in this
report, China’s ballistic
missile force is
acquiring conventional
medium-range and
intermediate-range ballistic
missiles that
extend the distance at which it can
threaten other
countries with conventional
precision or
near-precision strikes.
The PLA Air Force:
The
PLAAF is
developing
longer-range versions of the B-
6/BADGER bomber
that, when equipped with a
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 34
long-range
land-attack cruise missile, will
enable strikes as
far as the second island chain.
The PLAAF has,
however, encountered
difficulty
expanding its fleet of long-range
heavy transport
aircraft. Neither Russian nor
domestic PRC
manufacturers have proven able
to fill the PLAAF’s
requirement for long-haul
transports in
support of peacekeeping, disaster
relief, and other
requirements.
STRATEGIC
CAPABILITIES
China has made
steady progress in recent years
to develop
offensive nuclear, space, and cyber
warfare
capabilities—the only aspects of
China’s armed
forces that currently could be
used to pose a
global threat. There is little
evidence, however,
that China’s military and
civilian leaders
have fully thought through the
global and
systemic effects that would be
associated with
the employment of these
strategic
capabilities.
Nuclear Forces. China is both
qualitatively
and quantitatively
improving its strategic
missile forces. China’s
nuclear arsenal
currently consists
of approximately 20 silobased,
liquid-fueled
CSS-4 ICBMs;
approximately 30
solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-
31 and DF-31A
ICBMs; approximately 20
liquid-fueled,
limited-range CSS-3 ICBMs;
between 15 to 20
liquid-fueled CSS-2
intermediate-range
ballistic missiles; CSS-5
road-mobile,
solid-fueled MRBMs (for regional
deterrence
missions); and JL-1 submarinelaunched
ballistic missiles
(SLBM) for the
XIA-class SSBN,
although the operational
status of the
XIA-class SSBN/JL-1 combination
remains
questionable.
By 2015, China’s
nuclear forces will include
additional DF-31
and DF-31As, and enhanced
CSS-4s, CSS-3s,
and CSS-5s. The first of the
new JIN-class (Type
094) SSBN appears ready,
but the associated
JL-2 SLBM appears to have
encountered
difficulty, failing several of what
should have been
the final round of flight tests.
The date when the
JIN-class SSBN/JL-2 SLBM
combination will
be operational is uncertain.
China is also
currently working on a range of
technologies to
attempt to counter U.S. and
other militaries’
ballistic missile defense
systems, including
maneuvering re-entry
vehicles, MIRVs,
decoys, chaff, jamming,
thermal shielding,
and anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapons. PRC
official media also cites
numerous Second
Artillery Corps training
exercises
featuring maneuver, camouflage, and
launch operations
under simulated combat
conditions, which
are intended to increase
survivability.
Together with the increased
mobility and
survivability of the new generation
of missiles, these
technologies and training
enhancements
strengthen China’s nuclear
deterrent and
enhance its strategic strike
capabilities.
The introduction
of more mobile systems will
create new command
and control challenges for
China’s
leadership, which now confronts a
different set of
variables related to deployment
and release
authorities. For example, the PLA
has only a limited
capacity to communicate
with submarines at
sea, and the PLA Navy has
no experience in
managing a SSBN fleet that
performs strategic
patrols with live nuclear
warheads mated to
missiles. Land-based
mobile missiles
may face similar command and
control challenges
in wartime, although
probably not as
extreme as with submarines.
Beijing’s official
policy towards nuclear
deterrence
continues to focus on maintaining a
nuclear force
structure able to survive enemy
attack and respond
with sufficient strength to
inflict
unacceptable damage on the enemy. The
new generation of
mobile missiles,
maneuvering and
MIRV warheads, and
penetration aids
are intended to ensure the
viability of China’s
strategic deterrent in the
face of continued
advances in U.S. and, to a
lesser extent,
Russian strategic intelligence,
surveillance, and
reconnaissance; precision
strike; and
missile defense capabilities.
Beijing has
consistently asserted that it adheres
to a “no first use”
(NFU) policy, stating it
would use nuclear
forces only in response to a
nuclear strike
against China. China’s NFU
pledge consists of
two parts—China will never
use nuclear
weapons first against any nuclearMilitary
and
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 35
weapon state and
China will never use or
threaten to use
nuclear weapons against any
non-nuclear-weapon
state or nuclear-weaponfree
zone. However,
there is some ambiguity
over the
conditions under which China’s NFU
policy would or
would not apply, including for
example, whether
strikes on what China
considers its own
territory, demonstration
strikes, or high
altitude bursts would constitute
a first use.
Moreover, some PLA officers have
written publicly
of the need to spell out
conditions under
which China might need to
use nuclear weapons—for
example, if an
enemy’s
conventional attack threatened the
survival of China’s
nuclear force, or of the
regime itself.
However, there has been no
indication that
national leaders are willing to
attach such
nuances and caveats to China’s “no
first use”
doctrine.
Beijing will
likely continue to invest
considerable
resources to maintain a limited
nuclear deterrence
with regard to the United
States, also
referred to by some PRC writers as
a “sufficient and
effective” deterrent. Since
Beijing views
nuclear deterrence as crucial to
its national
security, it will continue to invest in
technology and
systems to ensure the PLA can
deliver a damaging
retaliatory nuclear strike.
Medium
and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles. China
is capable of targeting its nuclear forces throughout
the
region and most of the world, including the continental United States. Newer
systems, such as the DF-31, DF-
31A,
and JL-2, will give China a more survivable nuclear force.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 36
Space and
Counterspace. China’s space
activities and
capabilities, including ASAT
programs, have
significant implications for antiaccess/
area-denial in
Taiwan Strait
contingencies and
beyond. Many of China’s
non-military space
programs, including the
manned program and
the planned space station,
are run by the
PLA.
Reconnaissance: China is deploying
imagery,
reconnaissance,
and Earth resource systems with
military utility.
Examples include the Yaogan-
1, -2, -3, -4, -5,
and -6, the Haiyang-1B, the
CBERS-2B
satellite, and the Huanjing
disaster/environmental
monitoring satellite
constellation.
China is planning eight satellites
in the Huanjing
program that are capable of
visible, infrared,
multi-spectral, and synthetic
aperture radar
imaging. In the next decade,
even as Beijing
fields a larger and more capable
array of
reconnaissance satellites, it probably
will continue to
employ commercial satellite
imagery to
supplement its coverage. China
currently accesses
high-resolution, electrooptical
and synthetic
aperture radar commercial
imagery from all
of the major providers
including Spot
Image (Europe), Infoterra
(Europe), MDA
(Canada), Antrix (India),
GeoEye (United
States), and Digital Globe
(United States).
Manned Space: China’s most
recent manned
mission,
Shenzhou-7, launched on September
25, 2008, and
successfully conducted China’s
first spacewalk.
China will continue its manned
space program,
including both manned and
unmanned docking,
with the final goal of a
permanently manned
space station by 2020.
Navigation and
Timing: China is pursuing
several avenues to
reduce its dependence on any
single
foreign-owned satellite navigation
system. Currently,
the PRC uses the U.S. global
positioning system
(GPS), Russia’s GLONASS,
and its own
BeiDou-1 system for navigation.
The BeiDou-1
consists of three satellites and
serves both civil
and military purposes, but its
orbital
configuration covers only the East Asian
region. The
BeiDou-1 system will be replaced
by a more capable,
but still regionally
constrained,
BeiDou-2 system that is expected
to become
operational in 2011. The initial
BeiDou-2
constellation will become part of a
more advanced
BeiDou-2/Compass system with
global coverage,
expected in the 2015-2020
timeframe.
Communications: China uses
communications
satellites for
both regional and international
telecommunications
in support of civil and
military users,
including satellite television,
internet, and
telephony. China also maintains a
single data-relay
satellite launched in mid-2008,
the TianLian-1.
Along with regional
development of
related technologies, China has
recently entered
the world market by exporting
satellites and
infrastructure to Venezuela and
Nigeria. Although
the satellite built and
launched for
Nigeria failed, China continues to
market its
services worldwide, to customers
such as Pakistan,
Bolivia, Laos, and Vietnam.
ASAT Weapons: In January 2007,
China
successfully
tested a direct-ascent ASAT
weapon against a
PRC weather satellite,
demonstrating its
ability to attack satellites in
low-Earth orbit.
China continues to develop and
refine this
system, which is one component of a
multi-dimensional
program to limit or prevent
the use of
space-based assets by potential
adversaries during
times of crisis or conflict.
China’s nuclear
arsenal has long provided
Beijing with an
inherent ASAT capability,
although a nuclear
explosion in space would
also damage China’s
rapidly multiplying space
assets, along with
those of whomever it was
trying to target.
Foreign and indigenous
systems give China
the capability to jam
common satellite
communications bands and
GPS receivers. In
addition to the direct-ascent
ASAT program,
China is developing other
technologies and
concepts for kinetic and
directed-energy
(e.g., lasers, high-powered
microwave, and
particle beam) weapons for
ASAT missions.
Citing the requirements of its
manned and lunar
space programs, China is
improving its
ability to track and identify
satellites—a
prerequisite for effective, precise
counterspace
operations.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 37
Information
Warfare. There has been much
writing on
information warfare among China’s
military thinkers,
who indicate a strong
conceptual
understanding of its methods and
uses. For example,
a November 2006
Liberation Army
Daily commentary outlines:
[The] mechanism to
get the upper hand of
the enemy in a war
under conditions of
informatization
finds prominent expression
in whether or not
we are capable of using
various means to
obtain information and of
ensuring the
effective circulation of
information;
whether or not we are
capable of making
full use of the
permeability,
sharable property, and
connection of
information to realize the
organic merging of
materials, energy, and
information to
form a combined fighting
strength; [and,]
whether or not we are
capable of
applying effective means to
weaken the enemy
side’s information
superiority and
lower the operational
efficiency of
enemy information equipment.
The PLA is
investing in electronic
countermeasures,
defenses against electronic
attack (e.g.,
electronic and infrared decoys,
angle reflectors,
and false target generators), and
computer network
operations (CNO). China’s
CNO concepts
include computer network attack,
computer network
exploitation, and computer
network defense. The
PLA has established
information
warfare units to develop viruses to
attack enemy
computer systems and networks,
and tactics and
measures to protect friendly
computer systems
and networks. These units
include elements
of the militia, creating a
linkage between
PLA network operators and
China’s civilian
information technology
professionals.
Under the rubric of Integrated
Network Electronic
Warfare, the PLA seeks to
employ both
computer network operations and
electronic warfare
to deny an adversary access
to information
essential to conduct combat
operations.
POWER
PROJECTION—
MODERNIZATION
BEYOND TAIWAN
China continues to
invest in military programs
designed to
improve extended-range power
projection.
Current trends in China’s military
capabilities are a
major factor in changing East
Asian military
balances, and could provide
China with a force
capable of conducting a
range of military
operations in Asia well beyond
Taiwan. China’s
political leaders have also
charged the PLA
with developing capabilities
for military
operations other than war such as
peacekeeping,
disaster relief, and counterterrorism
operations. These
capabilities hold
the potential to
make positive contributions in
the delivery of
international public goods, but
also increase
Beijing’s options for military
coercion to gain
diplomatic advantage, advance
interests, or
resolve disputes in its favor.
Analysis of China’s
weapons development and
deployment
patterns suggests Beijing is already
looking at
contingencies beyond Taiwan as it
builds its force.
For example, new missile units
outfitted with
conventional, theater-range
missiles at
various locations in China could be
used in a variety
of non-Taiwan contingencies.
AEW&C and
aerial-refueling programs would
permit extended
air operations into the South
China Sea.
Advanced destroyers and
submarines could
protect and advance China’s
maritime interests
up to and beyond the second
island chain.
China’s expeditionary forces
(three airborne
divisions, two amphibious
infantry
divisions, two marine brigades, and
about seven
special operations groups) are
improving with the
introduction of new
equipment, better
unit-level tactics, and greater
coordination of
joint operations. Over the long
term, improvements
in China’s C4ISR,
including
space-based and over-the-horizon
sensors, could
enable Beijing to identify, track,
and target military
activities deep into the
western Pacific
Ocean.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 38
China’s increasing
focus on humanitarian
assistance and
disaster relief missions will
require a unique
set of technological
developments and
aircraft acquisitions,
including
strategic airlift, to support these
missions. Although
these capabilities would be
necessary to
support an immediate need, such as
an earthquake or
other natural disaster, they
would also enhance
its ability to support
military
operations along and beyond its
borders.
India. China has deepened
its ties with India
through increased
trade, high-level dialogues,
and an improved
military-to-military
relationship.
China and India agreed to boost
trade from $11.4
billion in 2007 to $40 billion in
2010, and they
have held several rounds of
dialogue over
disputed territorial claims. Sino-
Indian defense
ties were institutionalized in
2007 with the
establishment of an Annual
Defense Dialogue
and by conducting three
bilateral defense
exercises since 2007.
Nonetheless,
Beijing remains concerned with
persistent
disputes along China’s shared border
with India and the
strategic ramifications of
India’s rising
economic, political, and military
power. To improve
regional deterrence, the
PLA has replaced
older liquid-fueled, nuclearcapable
CSS-3
intermediate-range ballistic
missiles with more
advanced and survivable
solid-fueled CSS-5
MRBMs and may be
developing
contingency plans to move airborne
troops into the
region. China is currently
investing in road
development along the Sino-
Indian border
primarily to facilitate economic
development in
western China; improved roads
would also support
PLA border defense
operations.
Russia. Beijing continues
to view Moscow as
its closest
international partner, yet remains
concerned that
Russia’s long-term interests are
not wholly
consistent with China’s. Sino-
Russia bilateral
cooperation continues on many
international
issues, especially in Central Asia
where the two
jointly manage the Shanghai
Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Despite this
cooperation,
Russia has concerns about the
implications of
China’s rise, while PLA
strategists view
Russia as a potential long-term
military
challenge. Although China shifted its
strategic
orientation to the south and east
following the
collapse of the Soviet Union,
Beijing retains
significant force structure in the
Lanzhou, Beijing,
and Shenyang Military
Regions, in
addition to its conventional and
strategic missile
forces, to maintain deterrence.
Central Asia. China’s primary
interests in
Central Asia are
centered on building regional
influence,
obtaining natural resources and
energy, and
countering support for China’s
Uighur
separatists. Beijing has reached
agreements with
many Central Asian
governments to
build the infrastructure
necessary to
transport resources into western
China, such as a
pipeline that will stretch from
Turkmenistan
through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan into
China. Beijing has also
conducted
bilateral and multilateral exercises
with SCO member
states to enhance China’s
influence within
the SCO and to build cohesive
regional
opposition to Uighur activities.
Internal security
forces in Xinjiang could be
used in Central
Asian contingencies, and army
aviation and
trans-regional mobility operations
could be applied
to deploy combat power
rapidly to the
region in a crisis.
South China Sea. Tensions over
disputed
claims in the
South China Sea resurfaced in
2007 following
almost five years of relative
stability in the
region. Competition for
resources,
including oil and gas reserves, and
fishing resources
most likely fueled the rising
tension, although
other factors, such as
nationalism, also
contributed. China’s primary
interests in the
South China Sea are related to
securing its
extensive sovereignty claims in the
region and
exercising its rights as they relate to
exploiting
regional natural resources.
Additionally, a
stronger regional military
presence would
position China for force
projection,
blockade, and surveillance
operations to
influence the critical sea lanes in
the region—through
which some 50 percent of
global merchant
traffic passes. The
combination of
these interests likely contributes
to China’s
sensitivity over the presence of
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 39
foreign military
assets conducting routine
military
operations in waters beyond China’s
territorial
limits.
In response to the
2004 articulation of the
PLA’s “New
Historic Missions,” China’s senior
military leaders
began developing concepts for
an expanded
regional maritime strategy and
presence. For
example, in 2006, PLA Navy
Commander Wu
Shengli called for a “powerful
navy to protect
fishing, resource development
and strategic passageways
for energy.” Many of
these ideas echo
the debates in the late 1980s
and early 1990s
over building PLA naval
capabilities.
However, the rise of Taiwan
contingency
planning as the dominant driver of
PLA force
modernization in the mid-1990s, and
especially after
2001, largely sidelined these
discussions. China’s
probable plans to base the
Type 094 SSBN
(JIN-class) at Hainan Island
raises the
potential that the PLA Navy would
consider
conducting strategic patrols in the
waters of the
South China Sea requiring Beijing
to provide for a
more robust conventional
military presence
to ensure the protection of its
sea-based
deterrent. Such an increased PLA
presence including
surface, sub-surface, and
airborne
platforms, and possibly one or more of
China’s future
aircraft carriers, would provide
the PLA with an
enhanced extended range
power projection
capability and could alter
regional balances,
disrupting the delicate status
quo established by
the 2002 Declaration on the
Conduct of the
Parties in the South China Sea.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 40
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Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 41
Chapter
Four: Resources for Force Modernization
OVERVIEW
China’s leaders
can draw from a diverse range
of sources to
support PLA modernization,
including:
domestic defense investments,
indigenous defense
industrial development, a
growing research
and development and science
and technology
base, dual-use technologies, and
foreign technology
acquisition. The PLA has
decreased reliance
on foreign weapons
acquisitions as
China’s defense-industrial and
research bases
mature. However, the PLA still
looks to Russia to
fill near-term capability gaps,
despite an increasing,
but economically
conflicted,
reluctance on the part of the
Russians to do so.
China continues to leverage
foreign
investments, commercial joint ventures,
academic
exchanges, the experience of
repatriated PRC
students and researchers, and
state-sponsored
industrial/technical espionage
to increase the
level of technologies and
expertise
available to support military research,
development, and
acquisition. Beijing’s longterm
goal is to create
a wholly indigenous
defense industrial
sector, augmented by a strong
commercial sector,
to meet the needs of PLA
modernization and
to compete as a top-tier
producer in the
global arms market.
MILITARY
EXPENDITURE TRENDS
On March 4, 2010,
Beijing announced a 7.5
percent increase
in its military budget to
approximately
$78.6 billion. This increase
continues more
than two decades of sustained
annual increases
in China’s announced military
budget. The
priority China’s leaders place on
resourcing the
armed forces does not appear to
have been affected
by the international financial
downturn, despite
potential declines in the
economy and
government tax revenue.
Analysis of
2000-2009 data indicates China’s
officially
disclosed military budget grew at an
average of 11.8
percent in inflation-adjusted
terms over the period,
while gross domestic
product (GDP) grew
at 9.6 percent. Although
the military
budget increases are slightly larger
than the
percentage increases of its overall
economic growth,
the actual change in the
implied burden of
the official defense budget on
the economy has
been negligible. The
announced increase
for 2010 is the smallest
annual increase
since 1995. However, budget
growth tends to
slow in the last year of each
Five-Year Program,
and the defense budget
growth is still
higher than central government
budget growth.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 42
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA (millions of US$) FISCAL YEAR: 2008
Total
Active
Forces Reserve
Forces
Militia Amount Percentage (%)
Personnel
19,950 175 0 20,125 33.47
Training
&
Maintenance
18,599 247 1,149 19,989 33.24
Equipment
19,677 187 158 20,022 33.29
Total
58,221 608 1,307 60,136 100
Notes:
Data drawn
from China’s July 2009 report to the United Nations.
Personnel
expenses cover salaries, allowances, food, clothing and bedding,
insurance, welfare benefits and
pensions
for officers, non-ranking cadres, enlisted men, and contracted civilians.
Training and
maintenance expenses cover troop training, institutional education, and
running and
development
of daily work and activities.
Equipment
expenses cover research and development, procurement, maintenance, and
transportation and
storage
of weaponry and equipment.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1996
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Billion
2009 US$
PRC
Military Budget PRC Military Expenditure Estimate
China’s
Annual Real GDP and Military Budget Growth, 2000 - 2009.
PRC
Submission to United Nations on Military Expenditures, 2009.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 43
Estimating
China’s Actual Military
Expenditures.
The Department of Defense
estimates China’s
total military-related
spending for 2009
to be over $150 billion, using
2009 prices and
exchange rates.
Estimating actual
PLA military expenditures is
a difficult
process due to the lack of accounting
transparency and
China’s still incomplete
transition from a
command economy.
Moreover, China’s
published military budget
does not include
major categories of
expenditure. China’s
legislature has not made
public any details
of the role, if any, that it
plays in
exercising oversight of the PLA
budget.
The United States
and other countries have
urged China to
increase transparency in military
spending. In July
2009, China submitted a
report on its
military expenditures to the UN
Secretary General—the
second such report in as
many years. China’s
report was submitted in
the UN Simplified
Reporting Form, which
provides minimal
information on major budget
categories, in
contrast to the more detailed
Standardized
Reporting Form used by countries
practicing greater
defense transparency.
CHINA’S
ADVANCING DEFENSE
INDUSTRIES
Since the late
1990s, China’s state-owned
defense and
defense-related companies have
undergone a
broad-based transformation.
Beijing is
improving business practices,
streamlining
bureaucracy, broadening factory
worker
opportunities and incentives, shortening
development
timelines, boosting quality
control, and
increasing production capacity for
military orders.
Beijing is also emphasizing
integration of
defense and non-defense sectors
to leverage the
latest dual-use technologies and
the output from
China’s expanding science and
technology base.
Augmented by direct
acquisition of
foreign weapons and technology,
these reforms have
enabled China to develop
and produce
advanced weapon systems that
incorporate
mid-1990s technology in many
areas, and some
systems – particularly ballistic
missiles – that
rival any in the world today.
Civil-Military
Integration. Development of
innovative
dual-use technology and an
industrial base
that serves both military and
civilian needs is
among the highest priorities of
China’s
leadership. President Hu expressed in
his political
report to the CCP’s 17th Party
Congress:
We must establish
sound systems of
weapons and
equipment research and
manufacturing …
and combine military
efforts with
civilian support, build the
armed forces through
diligence and thrift,
and blaze a path
of development with
Chinese
characteristics featuring military
and civilian
integration.
China’s defense
industry has benefited from
integration with
China’s rapidly expanding
civilian economy
and science and technology
sector,
particularly elements that have access to
foreign
technology. Progress within individual
defense sectors
appears to be linked to the
relative
integration of each—through China’s
civilian economy—into
the global production
and research and
development (R&D) chain.
For example, the
shipbuilding and defense
electronics
sectors, benefiting from China’s
leading role in
producing commercial shipping
and information
technologies, have witnessed
the greatest
progress over the last decade.
Information
technology companies, including
Huawei, Datang,
and Zhongxing, maintain
close ties to the
PLA and collaborate on R&D.
In contrast,
enterprises producing highperformance
computers,
advanced applications
software, and
specialized top-end
semiconductors/microprocessors—key
to the
evolution of
increasingly advanced and capable
defense
microelectronics and applications, but
with limited or no
counterparts in the PRC
civil-industrial
sector—have experienced
slower progress. The
aviation and ordnance
sectors have
similarly suffered from a limited
number of spin-off
benefits, despite
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 44
partnerships
between foreign multinational
corporations and
domestic industry.
Sector-by-Sector
Analysis. Progress across
China’s defense
industry sectors has been
uneven. Production
trends and resource
allocation appear
to favor missile and space
systems, followed
by maritime assets (both
surface and
sub-surface), aircraft, and ground
force materiel. In
all areas, China is increasing
the quality of its
output and surge production
capabilities, if
not capacities. However, many
of China’s most
advanced systems are still
based heavily on
foreign designs copied
through reverse
engineering, highlighting a
persistent
weakness in China’s capability for
overall system
design and integration.
Missile and Space
Industry: China produces a
broad range of
sophisticated ballistic, cruise,
air-to-air, and
surface-to-air missiles. Many of
China’s primary
final assembly and rocket
motor production
facilities have received
upgrades over the
past few years, likely
increasing
production capacity. In addition to
supplying China’s
military, complete systems
and missile
technologies could also be marketed
for export. Surge
production for these systems
could result in a
significantly higher output of
SRBMs and perhaps
double the number of
MRBMs per year.
China’s space launch
vehicle industry
is expanding to support
satellite launch
services and the manned space
program.
Shipbuilding
Industry: China operates a
vibrant and
globally competitive shipbuilding
industry. China is
the second largest
shipbuilder in the
world. Shipyard expansion
and modernization
have increased China’s
shipbuilding
capacity and capability, generating
benefits for all
types of military projects,
including:
submarines; surface combatants;
naval aviation,
including aircraft carriers; and
lift assets. China
continues to rely on foreign
suppliers for some
propulsion units and, to a
lesser degree,
fire control systems, cruise
missiles,
ship-to-air missiles, torpedo systems,
sensors, and other
advanced electronics.
Modular
shipbuilding techniques will allow
China to spread
production across multiple
locations,
increasing both efficiency and output.
China has already
demonstrated an ability to
surge submarine
and amphibious production.
Armament Industry:
China’s ground force
modernization
includes production of new
tanks, armored
personnel carriers, and artillery
pieces. There have
been advances in almost
every area of PLA
ground forces with new
production
capacity to accommodate surge
requests. China’s
reliance on foreign partners
to fill gaps in
critical technical capabilities
could still limit
actual surge output.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 45
Select
PLA Modernization Areas, 2000–2009. This graphic
compares the share of moderni operational
systems within
the
PLA in 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2009.
i For
surface combatants “modern” is defined as multi-mission platforms with
significant capabilities in at least two
warfare
areas. “Modern” for submarines is defined as those platforms capable of
firing an anti-ship cruise missile. For
air
forces, “modern” is defined as 4th generation
platforms (Su-27, Su-30, F-10) and platforms with 4th
generation-like
capabilities
(FB-7). “Modern” SAMs are defined as advanced Russian systems (SA-10,
SA-20), and their PRC
indigenous
equivalents (HQ-9).
Aviation Industry:
China’s commercial and
military aviation
industries have advanced from
producing direct
copies of early Soviet models
to developing and
producing indigenous
aircraft. These
include improved versions of
older aircraft and
modern fourth generation
fighters. China’s
commercial aircraft industry
has imported
high-precision and technologically
advanced machine
tools, electronics, and other
components that
can also be used in the
production of
military aircraft. However,
China’s ability to
surge production in the
aircraft industry
will be limited by its reliance
on foreign
sourcing for aircraft engines and
avionics, as well
as the availability of skilled
personnel and
facilities.
Foreign Technology
Acquisition. Key areas
where China
continues to rely most heavily on
foreign
technologies include: guidance and
control systems,
turbine engine technology, and
enabling
technologies such as precision
machine tools,
advanced diagnostic and
forensic
equipment, applications and processes
essential to rapid
prototyping, and computerassisted
design/manufacturing.
China often
pursues these
foreign technologies for the
purpose of reverse
engineering.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Naval
Surface Forces Submarine Forces Air Force Air Defense Force
Percent
Modern 2000 2004 2008 2009
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 46
Russia in recent
years has been China’s primary
weapons and
materiel provider, selling Beijing
advanced fighter
aircraft, missile systems,
submarines, and
destroyers. Relying on
Russian components
for several of its
production
programs, China purchased
production rights
to Russian weapon designs
and is negotiating
the purchase of several
advanced systems.
Additionally, Russia
cooperates with
China on technical, design, and
material support
for numerous weapons and
space systems.
Israel previously
supplied advanced military
technology to
China, but has reformed its
export control
regime through the passage of a
Defense Export
Control Act in July 2007 and
the adoption of
implementing regulations in
December 2007.
Since 2003, China
has been pressuring the
European Union
(EU) Member States to lift the
embargo on lethal
military sales to China that
the EU imposed in
response to China’s 1989
crackdown on
Tiananmen Square
demonstrators. In
their Joint Statement
following the 2004
EU-China Summit,
European and PRC
leaders committed to work
towards lifting
the embargo. Although the issue
officially remains
on the EU agenda, there is no
consensus among
the EU Member States on
lifting the
embargo in the near future.
In addition,
economic espionage, supported by
extensive open
source research, computer
network
exploitation, and targeted intelligence
operations also
obtain technologies to
supplement
indigenous military modernization
efforts.
In its 2008
report, Targeting U.S. Technologies:
A Trend Analysis
of Reporting From Defense
Industry, the Defense
Security Service (DSS)
found that in the
previous year, foreign
collectors,
including the PRC, attempted to
obtain information
and technologies from each
of the 20
categories of the Developing Sciences
and Technologies
List (DSTL). The DSTL is a
compendium of
scientific and technological
capabilities being
developed worldwide that
have the potential
to enhance or degrade U.S.
military
capabilities significantly in the future.
The DSS report
described China’s science and
technology
collection priorities as: guidance
and control
systems, advanced energy
technologies,
nanotechnology, space and
counterspace
systems, nuclear forces,
innovative
materials, aeronautics and
astronautic
mechanisms, computer-aided
manufacturing and
design, and information
technologies. The
PRC continues to target
these
technologies.
The U.S.
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
Industry and
Security and the Department of
Justice identified
at least 26 major cases since
2006 linking China
to the acquisition of
technologies and
applications cited above, as
well as to current
and future warship
technology,
electronic propulsion systems,
controlled power
amplifiers with military
applications,
space launch technical data and
services, C-17
aircraft, Delta IV rockets,
infrared cameras,
information related to cruise
missile design,
and military-grade
accelerometers. Additional
technologies cited
in these cases
consisted of microwave
integrated
circuits; weapons scopes; restricted
night-vision
equipment and data;
satellite/missile
thermal insulation blankets;
controlled
electronic components; traveling
wave tubes used
with satellite and radar
systems; microwave
amplifiers with radar
applications;
export controlled technical data
related to plasma
technology for UAVs; carbon
fiber material for
aircraft, rockets, spacecraft,
and the uranium
enrichment process; and,
extended range
programmable logic devices.
The PRC’s
continuing efforts to acquire U.S.
military and
dual-use technologies are enabling
the PRC science
and technology base to
diminish the U.S.
technological edge in areas
critical to the
development of military weapons
and communications
systems. Additionally, the
technologies China
has acquired could be used
to develop more
advanced technologies by
shortening PRC
R&D cycles.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 47
LOOKING
TO THE FUTURE:
TRENDS
AND PROJECTIONS
China’s National
Medium- and Long-Term
Program for
Science and Technology
Development (2006-2020),
issued by the State
Council in
February 2006, seeks to transform
China into an “innovation-oriented
society by
2020.” The plan
defines China’s science and
technology focus
in terms of “basic research,”
“leading-edge
technologies,” “key fields and
priority subjects,”
and “major special items”—–
all of which have
military applications.
Basic Research. As part of a broad
effort to
expand basic
research capabilities, China
identified five
areas that have military
applications as
major strategic needs or science
research plans
requiring active government
involvement and
funding:
Material design and preparation;
Manufacturing in extreme environmental
conditions;
Aeronautic and astronautic mechanics;
Information technology development; and
Nanotechnology research.
In nanotechnology,
China has progressed from
virtually no
research or funding in 2002 to
being a close
second to the United States in
total government
investment.
Leading-edge
Technologies. China is focusing
on the following
technologies for rapid
development:
Information Technology: Priorities include
intelligent
perception technologies, ad hoc
networks, and
virtual reality technologies;
New Materials: Priorities include
smart
materials and
structures, high-temperature
superconducting
technologies, and highly
efficient energy
materials technologies;
Advanced Manufacturing: Priorities
include extreme
manufacturing technologies
and intelligent
service advanced machine
tools;
Advanced Energy Technologies: Priorities
include hydrogen
energy and fuel cell
technologies,
alternative fuels, and
advanced vehicle
technologies;
Marine Technologies: Priorities include
three-dimensional
maritime environmental
monitoring
technologies, fast, multiparameter
ocean floor survey
technologies,
and deep-sea
operations technologies; and,
Laser and Aerospace Technologies are also
high priorities.
Key Fields and
Priority Subjects. China has
identified certain
industries and technology
groups with
potential to provide technological
breakthroughs,
remove technical obstacles
across industries,
and improve international
competitiveness.
Specifically, China’s defense
industries are
pursuing advanced
manufacturing,
information technology, and
defense
technologies. Examples include radar,
counterspace
capabilities, secure C4ISR, smart
materials, and
low-observable technologies.
Major Special
Items. China has also identified
16 “major special
items” for which it plans to
develop or expand
indigenous capabilities.
These include core
electronic components;
high-end universal
chips and operating system
software; very
large-scale integrated circuit
manufacturing;
next-generation broadband
wireless mobile
communications; high-grade
numerically
controlled machine tools; large
aircraft;
high-resolution satellites; manned
spaceflight; and
lunar exploration.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 48
Status of Aircraft
Carrier Developments
China has an
aircraft carrier research and design program, which includes continued
renovations to the
former Soviet Kuznetsov-class Hull-2, the ex-VARYAG. Beginning in early
2006 with the
release of China’s 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010),
PRC-owned media reported
high-level
government and military official statements on China’s intent to build
aircraft
carriers. In April
2009 PRC Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli stated that “China will
develop its fleet
of aircraft carriers in a harmonious manner. We will prudently decide the
policy [we will
follow with regard to building aircraft carriers]. I am willing to listen
to the
views of experts
from the navies of other countries and to seek opinions from our country.”
While meeting with
Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada in March 2009, PRC
Minister of
Defense General Liang Guanglie stressed that China is the only big nation
that does
not have aircraft
carriers and stated that “China cannot be without aircraft carriers
forever.”
China continues to
show interest in procuring Su-33 carrier-borne fighters from Russia. Since
2006 China and
Russia had been in negotiations for the sale of 50 Su-33 Flanker-D
fighters at a
cost of up to $2.5
billion. These negotiations reportedly stalled after Russia refused a
request
from China for an
initial delivery of two trial aircraft. Russian defense ministry sources
confirmed that the
refusal was due to findings that China had produced its own copycat
version
of the Su-27SK
fighter jet.
The PLA Navy has
reportedly decided to initiate a program to train 50 navy pilots to
operate
fixed-wing
aircraft from an aircraft carrier. In May 2009, Brazilian Defense
Minister Nelson
Jobim announced
that the Brazilian Navy would provide training to PLA Navy officers in
aircraft carrier
operations.
Analysts in and
out of government project that China will not have an operational,
domestically
produced carrier
and associated ships before 2015. However, changes in China’s
shipbuilding
capability and
degree of foreign assistance to the program could alter those
projections. In
March 2009, PLA
Navy Admiral Wu Huayang stated that “China is capable of building
aircraft
carriers. We have
such strength. Building aircraft carriers requires economic and
technological
strength. Given the level of development in our country, I think we have
such
strength.” The PLA
Navy is considering building multiple carriers by 2020.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 49
Chapter
Five: Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait
OVERVIEW
Security in the
Taiwan Strait is largely a
function of
dynamic interactions between and
among mainland
China, Taiwan, and the United
States. In this
context, over the course of 2009,
the security situation
in Taiwan remained, for
the most part,
unchanged. On the mainland,
Beijing’s strategy
toward Taiwan continued to
incorporate
elements of persuasion and
coercion to deter
or repress the development of
political
attitudes in Taiwan favoring
independence. The
two sides made progress in
expanding
cross-Strait trade and economic
links, as well as
people-to-people contacts.
Beijing’s decision
to not oppose Taiwan’s
meaningful
participation in certain international
organizations that
do not require statehood for
membership, such
as the World Health
Assembly,
addressed in limited terms Taiwan’s
expressed desire
for greater international space.
Alongside positive
public statements about the
Taiwan Strait
situation from top leaders in
Beijing following
the election of Taiwan
President Ma
Ying-jeou, however, there have
been no signs that
Beijing’s military
dispositions
opposite Taiwan have changed
significantly.
The PLA has
developed and deployed military
capabilities to
coerce Taiwan or to attempt an
invasion, if
necessary. These improvements
pose new
challenges to Taiwan’s security,
which has been
based historically upon the
PLA’s inability to
project power across the 100
nautical mile
Taiwan Strait, natural geographic
advantages of
island defense, Taiwan’s armed
forces’
technological superiority, and the
possibility of
U.S. intervention.
For its part,
Taiwan has taken important steps to
build its war
reserve stocks, as well as improve
its defense
industrial base, joint operations
capability, crisis
response, and officer and noncommissioned
officer (NCO)
corps. These
improvements have,
on the whole, reinforced
Taiwan’s natural
defensive advantages in the
face of Beijing’s
continuous military build-up.
Following the
release of its first Quadrennial
Defense Review in
March 2009, Taiwan has
also focused on
creating an all-volunteer
military and
reducing its active military endstrength
from 275,000 to
215,000 personnel to
create a “small
but smart and strong force,”
while maintaining
its defense budget at three
percent of its
GDP. Under this plan, which it
plans to complete
by December 2014, the cost
difference of a
smaller force will free up
resources to
increase volunteer salaries and
benefits.
The U.S.
Government opposes unilateral
changes to the
status quo in the Taiwan Strait
by either side,
and calls for peaceful resolution
of cross-Strait
differences in a manner
acceptable to the
people on both sides.
Consistent with
the Taiwan Relations Act
[Public Law 96-8
(1979)], the United States has
helped to maintain
peace, security, and stability
in the Taiwan
Strait by providing defense
articles and
services to support Taiwan’s selfdefense.
In furtherance of
this end, in January
2010, the Obama
Administration announced its
intent to sell to
Taiwan $6.4 billion in defensive
arms and
equipment, including: UH-60 utility
helicopters;
PATRIOT PAC-3 air and missile
defense systems;
HARPOON training missiles;
Multifunctional
Information Distribution
Systems technical
support for Taiwan’s Posheng
C4ISR system; and
OSPREY-class
minehunting ships.
In addition, the U.S.
Department of
Defense, through transformation
of the U.S. Armed
Forces and global force
posture
realignments, is maintaining the
capacity of the
United States to defend against
Beijing’s use of
force or coercion against
Taiwan.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 50
BEIJING’S
STRATEGY IN THE
TAIWAN
STRAIT
Beijing appears
prepared to defer the use of
force, as long as
it believes that long-term
reunification
remains possible and the costs of
conflict outweigh
the benefits. Beijing argues
that the credible
threat to use force is essential
to maintain the
conditions for political progress,
and to prevent
Taiwan from making moves
toward de jure independence.
Beijing has
refused for
decades to renounce the use of force
to resolve the
Taiwan issue, despite
simultaneously
professing its desire for
peaceful
unification under the principle of “one
country, two
systems.”
The circumstances
under which the mainland
has historically
warned it would use force have
evolved over time
in response to the island’s
declarations of
political status, changes in PLA
capabilities, and
Beijing’s view of Taiwan’s
relations with
other countries. These
circumstances, or “red
lines,” have included:
Formal declaration of Taiwan
independence;
Undefined moves toward Taiwan
independence;
Internal unrest on Taiwan;
Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-
Strait dialogue on
unification;
Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal
affairs; and,
Foreign troops stationed on Taiwan.
Article 8 of the
March 2005 “Anti-Secession
Law” states that
Beijing may use “non-peaceful
means” if “secessionist
forces … cause the fact
of Taiwan’s
secession from China;” if “major
incidents
entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur;
or, if “possibilities
for peaceful reunification”
are exhausted. The
ambiguity of these
“redlines”
preserves Beijing’s flexibility.
Taiwan
Strait SRBM & SAM Coverage. This map
depicts notional coverage based on the range of the CSS-
6
and CSS-7 SRBMs and the Russian-designed SA-20 PMU2 SAM system. Actual
air defense coverage would
be
non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites. If deployed
near the Taiwan Strait, the
PMU2’s
extended range provides the PLA’s SAM force with an offensive capability
against Taiwan aircraft.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 51
BEIJING’S
COURSES OF ACTION
AGAINST
TAIWAN
The PLA is capable
of increasingly
sophisticated
military action against Taiwan.
Some analysts hold
that Beijing would first
pursue a measured
approach characterized by
signaling its
readiness to use force, followed by
a deliberate
buildup of force to optimize the
speed of engagement
over strategic deception.
Others contend
that it is more likely that Beijing
would sacrifice
preparations in favor of surprise
to force rapid
military and/or political
resolution before
other countries could respond.
If a quick
resolution is not possible, Beijing
would seek to:
Deter potential U.S. intervention;
Failing that, delay U.S. intervention and
seek victory in an
asymmetric, limited,
quick war; or,
Fight to a standstill and pursue a political
settlement after a
protracted conflict.
Maritime
Quarantine or Blockade. Although a
traditional
maritime quarantine or blockade
would have greater
impact on Taiwan, at least
in the near term,
such an operation would tax
PLA Navy
capabilities. PRC military writings
describe potential
alternative solutions—air
blockades, missile
attacks, and mining—to
obstruct harbors
and approaches. Beijing could
declare that ships
en route to Taiwan must stop
in mainland ports
for inspection prior to
transiting to
Taiwan ports. Beijing could also
attempt the
equivalent of a blockade by
declaring exercise
or missile closure areas in
approaches to
ports, in effect closing port
access and
diverting merchant traffic. The PLA
employed this
method during the 1995-96
missile firings
and live-fire exercises. There is
risk, however,
that Beijing would underestimate
the degree to
which any attempt to limit
maritime traffic
to and from Taiwan would
trigger
countervailing international pressure and
military
escalation. China today probably could
not enforce a full
military blockade, interdicting
and if necessary
destroying nearly all traffic
into Taiwan,
particularly in the face of
intervention by a
major naval power; but its
ability to do so
will improve significantly over
the next five to
ten years.
Limited Force or
Coercive Options. Beijing
might use a
variety of disruptive, punitive, or
lethal military
actions in a limited campaign
against Taiwan,
likely in conjunction with overt
and clandestine
economic and political
activities. Such a
campaign could include
computer network
or limited kinetic attacks
against Taiwan’s
political, military, and
economic
infrastructure to induce fear in
Taiwan and degrade
the populace’s confidence
in the Taiwan
leadership. Similarly, PLA
special operations
forces could infiltrate Taiwan
and conduct
attacks against infrastructure or
leadership
targets.
Air and Missile
Campaign. Limited SRBM
attacks and
precision strikes against air defense
systems, including
air bases, radar sites,
missiles, space
assets, and communications
facilities, could
be conducted in an attempt to
degrade Taiwan’s
defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s
leadership, or
break the Taiwan people’s will to
fight.
Amphibious
Invasion. Publicly available PRC
writings describe
different operational concepts
for amphibious
invasion. The most prominent
of these, the
Joint Island Landing Campaign,
envisions a
complex operation relying on
coordinated,
interlocking campaigns for
logistics, air and
naval support, and electronic
warfare. The
objective would be to break
through or
circumvent shore defenses, establish
and build a
beachhead, transport personnel and
materiel to
designated landing sites in the north
or south of Taiwan’s
western coastline, and
launch attacks to
seize and occupy key targets
and/or the entire
island.
The PLA is capable
of accomplishing various
amphibious
operations short of a full-scale
invasion of
Taiwan. With few overt military
preparations
beyond routine training, China
could launch an
invasion of small Taiwan-held
islands such as
the Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 52
invasion of a
medium-sized, defended offshore
island such as
Mazu or Jinmen is within
China’s
capabilities. Such an invasion would
demonstrate
military capability and political
resolve while
achieving tangible territorial gain
and simultaneously
showing some measure of
restraint.
However, this kind of operation
includes
significant, if not prohibitive, political
risk because it
could galvanize the Taiwan
populace and
generate international opposition.
Large-scale
amphibious invasion is one of the
most complicated
and difficult military
maneuvers. Success
depends upon air and sea
superiority, rapid
buildup and sustainment of
supplies on shore,
and uninterrupted support.
An attempt to
invade Taiwan would strain
China’s untested
armed forces and invite
international
intervention. These stresses,
combined with
China’s combat force attrition
and the complexity
of urban warfare and
counterinsurgency
(assuming a successful
landing and
breakout), make amphibious
invasion of Taiwan
a significant political and
military risk.
Taiwan’s investments to harden
infrastructure and
strengthen defensive
capabilities could
also decrease Beijing’s ability
to achieve its
objectives.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 53
Chapter
Six: U.S.-China Military-to-Military Contacts
OVERVIEW
In his July 27,
2009 speech before the opening
session of the
first U.S.-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue,
President Obama observed
that the “relationship
between the United States
and China will
shape the 21st century, which
makes it as
important as any bilateral
relationship in
the world.” The United States
and China are
committed to the pursuit of a
bilateral
relationship that is positive,
cooperative, and
comprehensive—an aspiration
that was
re-affirmed in the U.S.-China Joint
Statement of
November 17, 2009.
Sustainable and
reliable U.S.-China military-tomilitary
ties are an
important component of the
overall bilateral
U.S.-China relationship and are
necessary for the
relationship to be
comprehensive.
U.S.-China
military-to-military contacts are not
ends in and of
themselves. The complexity of
the security environment,
both in the Asia-
Pacific region and
globally, calls for a
continuous
dialogue between the armed forces
of the United
States and China, at all levels, to
expand practical
cooperation in areas in which
the two countries’
national interests converge
and to discuss
candidly those areas in which
there is
disagreement. Moreover, given the
advances in China’s
military capabilities and its
more broadly
ranging military operations and
mission sets, as
documented in the preceding
pages of this
report, a continuous military-tomilitary
dialogue between
the United States and
China becomes
especially important during
periods of
friction and turbulence.
China’s senior
political and military leaders,
including
President Hu Jintao, have stated their
commitment to work
to further develop and
improve bilateral
military-to-military contacts
and exchanges.
Yet, a sustained exchange
program has been
difficult to achieve. The
result is an
on-again/off-again military
relationship that
limits the ability of the two
armed forces to
explore areas of cooperation,
enhance mutual
understanding, improve
communications,
and reduce the risk that
misapprehension or
miscalculation could lead
to crisis or
conflict.
The United States
bases its contacts and
exchanges with China’s
military on the
principles of
mutual respect, mutual trust,
reciprocity,
mutual interest, continuous
dialogue, and
mutual risk reduction. The
Department of
Defense conducts them in a
manner consistent
with the provisions of
Section 1201 of
the National Defense
Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000 [Public
Law 106-65
(1999)], which provides the
Secretary of
Defense sufficiently broad latitude
to develop a
program of exchange with China
that supports
national interests.
OPPORTUNITIES
AND CHALLENGES
IN
U.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TOMILITARY
RELATIONS
In speaking of
U.S.-China relations, President
Obama has said
that “our ability to partner is a
prerequisite for
progress on many of the most
pressing global
challenges.” Accordingly, the
Department of
Defense, in concert with other
departments and
agencies of the U.S.
Government, is
investing in multiple channels
for dialogue and
consultation with the People’s
Republic of China,
such as the State and
Treasury-led
Strategic and Economic Dialogue,
an enhanced
program of military-to-military
contacts and
exchanges, and an invigorated
Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement
process to manage
maritime safety issues
between our two
armed forces.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 54
Through these and
other important mechanisms,
over the course of
2009, the United States
worked with China
to address the challenges
created by North
Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, and a
host of regional and
transnational
security issues.
This cooperation
was possible, in part, due to
the stability that
returned to the U.S.-China
military-to-military
relationship in 2009,
following China’s
decision to suspend a number
of planned
exchanges in response to the
October 2008 U.S.
announcement of arms sales
to Taiwan. China
decided to again suspend
military exchanges
following the January 2010
announcement of
additional U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan. This
announcement was consistent
with long standing
U.S. policy to assist Taiwan
to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.
Beijing’s response
indicates that it continues to
view a withdrawal
from military dialogue as a
punitive measure.
While China has repeatedly
stated its desire
for improved U.S.-China
military-to-military
relations, it has repeatedly
sublimated this
goal to others it perceives as
more important.
The United States
seeks to work with China to
find meaningful
ways to define the terms of the
military-to-military
relationship, not by the
differences
between the two sides, but rather by
the interests they
share. The U.S.-China
military-to-military
relationship also requires a
more balanced and
reciprocal footing to ensure
stability and
consistency across the exchange
program. Stability
in U.S.-China military-tomilitary
exchanges is
necessary to build mutual
trust and
establish rules of the road that can
reduce the risk of
accidents or incidents. Given
the breadth and
complexity of the U.S.-China
relationship,
occasional political turbulence is
inevitable. Only
when China determines that it
is in its own
interest to sustain engagement
through periods of
turbulence will it be possible
to build a more
solid foundation for military-tomilitary
relations.
The Department of
Defense prioritizes
exchanges that
focus on building cooperative
capacity,
fostering institutional understanding,
and developing
common views on the
international
security environment and related
security
challenges. To build cooperative
capacity, for
example, the U.S. Armed Forces
are looking to
build upon the positive
experiences of
navy-to-navy cooperation with
China in concert
with the international
community to
combat piracy in the Gulf of
Aden.
There are other
areas where the U.S. and PRC
militaries can
find common ground to work
together, whether
it is countering piracy in other
parts of the
world, supporting international
peace operations,
pursuing a shared
commitment to
non-proliferation, combating
infectious
disease, or delivering humanitarian
assistance and
disaster relief to those in need.
During Secretary
Gates’s October 27, 2009
meeting with China’s
Central Military
Commission Vice
Chairman General Xu
Caihou, the two
sides agreed to concrete and
practical measures
for working together on
some of these
issues in 2010, including a joint
maritime search
and rescue exercise, a disaster
management
exchange, and military medical
subject matter
expert exchanges.
There are
opportunities for the United States
and China to
expand reciprocal exchanges,
Topics Discussed
and Questions Asked
During
military-to-military contacts and
exchanges with the
PRC in 2009, the
Chinese discussed
and expressed interest in
U.S.-China defense
relations, the rationale
for U.S. military
deployments around
China, the U.S. relationship
with Taiwan,
maritime safety,
military transformation and
modernization, and
regional issues such as
North Korea, Iran,
Afghanistan, and
Pakistan.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 55
Benefits China Expects
to Gain
Perception
Management: China’s civilian and military leaders use
defense contacts with the
United States and
other countries as avenues to communicate political messages and shape
perceptions of
China among foreign leaders.
Insights on the
United States: The PLA seeks to use contact with the United
States to gain a
better
understanding of U.S. leadership, policies, capabilities, and intent, and
to gain insights into
potential U.S.
vulnerabilities. Additionally, China hopes to learn more about U.S.
military
relations with
other countries of interest to Beijing.
Enhancement of
Military Capabilities: The PLA seeks to benefit from functional and
professional
exchanges with the United States in areas such as doctrine development,
force
structure, personnel
management, professional military education, training, technology, and
technical
information that would support PLA defense modernization. These
contribute,
indirectly, to
military capabilities by improving areas such as officer professionalism,
exposure
to foreign
militaries and concepts, personnel systems, and financial management.
International
Prestige: Senior political leaders in Beijing also pursue contacts with the
Department of
Defense to elevate China’s status as a regional and world power. In this
context,
China’s leaders
seek to use “normal” defense relations with the United States to enhance
China’s
international
status and to drive a wedge between the United States, its allies, and
its partners,
including Taiwan.
Domestic Politics:
Defense relations with the United States may provide the PLA with
leverage
in internal
political debates regarding overall Chinese policies toward the United
States and other
regional actors.
including those
between mid-grade and junior
officers and among
institutions of professional
military
education. Additional opportunities to
improve
institutional understanding exist in the
area of policy and
strategy for nuclear, space,
and cyber-security
issues. Following a first
round of talks on
nuclear policy and strategy in
April 2008, China
deferred further discussion.
Secretary Gates
raised the importance of
building momentum
behind this dialogue with
General Xu in
October 2009. The Commander,
U.S. Strategic
Command, General Chilton, did
likewise during
General Xu’s brief visit to U.S.
Strategic Command.
Continuous
dialogue, particularly at high levels,
is an important
platform for developing
common views on
the international security
environment and
related security challenges,
such as North
Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan.
Continuous dialogue also permits a
respectful
discussion of other bilateral issues
including those
for which the two sides have
differences. For
example, the United States and
China continue to
have differences over the
rights of coastal
states in their exclusive
economic zones,
and the appropriate response
to such
differences. The Department of
Defense has not
observed a resurgence of the
sort of harassment
by PRC fishing vessels of
U.S. naval
auxiliary ships conducting routine
and lawful
military operations beyond the
PRC’s territorial
seas that occurred in spring
2009, but it could
become an issue again.
The United States
remains vigilant in its watch
for behavior that
puts at risk the safety of U.S.
soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines or is in
clear violation of
international norms. The
Department will
continue to use all available
channels, in
particular an invigorated MMCA
and Defense Policy
Coordination Talks process,
to communicate the
U.S. Government position
on these and other
matters to the PLA, while
taking advantage
of opportunities for the two
sides to discuss
practical ways to reduce the
chances for
misunderstanding and
miscalculation
between our armed forces.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 56
As President Obama
has said, “[the U.S.-China]
relationship has
not been without disagreement
and difficulty.
But the notion that we must be
adversaries is not
pre-destined.” The
Department of
Defense, along with other
elements of the
U.S. Government, will continue
to engage China to
develop further those areas
where cooperation
is possible. The United
States will also
continue to encourage China to
improve
transparency and openness in its
military affairs,
including defense expenditure,
strategies, plans,
and intentions, and to
recognize the
importance of integrating more
firmly with a
globalizing world, and to act in
ways that support
and strengthen international
political, economic,
and security systems.
The Department of
Defense’s strategy for U.S.-
China
military-to-military contacts fits within
the broader
National Defense Strategy which
acknowledges that
U.S. defense interaction with
China will be
long-term and multi-dimensional
and will involve
peacetime engagement as
much as fielded
combat capabilities.
The Department of
Defense will continue to use
military
engagement with the PRC to
demonstrate U.S.
commitment to the Asia-
Pacific region and
to encourage China to play a
constructive role
in the region, and act as a
partner in
addressing common security
challenges. At the
same time, the Department
of Defense has a
special responsibility to
monitor China’s
military modernization and to
maintain
deterrence of conflict. Through force
posture, presence,
actions to strengthen
alliances and
partnerships, and capability
developments, the
Department of Defense
demonstrates the
U.S. will and ability to
maintain peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 57
Highlights of
High-Level Exchanges and Dialogues
U.S. Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, visit to China: From April 17-21,
2009, Admiral
Roughead visited China to conduct a working visit with Admiral Wu
Shengli,
the PRC Navy
Commander, and attend the beginning of the PLA Navy’s International Fleet
Review, held in
Qingdao from April 20-25. In addition to Admiral Wu, Admiral Roughead met
with Vice Minister
of Foreign Affairs He Yafei, Minister of Defense General Liang Guanglie,
and North Sea
Fleet Commander Admiral Tian Zhong. The purpose of the visit was to
foster
U.S.-China
navy-to-navy and overall military relationships, and to explore areas for
enhanced
cooperation. PRC
officials reiterated their concern about Taiwan arms sales, but also
emphasized the
cooperative trend in the U.S.-PRC bilateral relationship. Admiral
Roughead's
discussions with
Admiral Wu focused on operational safety in the context of U.S. Navy-PLA
Navy interactions,
port visits and reciprocity, and future areas of cooperation including
counterpiracy
and potential
humanitarian search and rescue exercises.
Defense
Consultative Talks: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michèle
Flournoy,
traveled to
Beijing to conduct the tenth DCT with the PLA from June 23-24, 2009. The
DCT is
the highest level
bilateral dialogue between the U.S. and PRC defense establishments, and
provides a
framework for the military-to-military relationship. During the two days
of talks
with the Deputy
Chief of the PLA General Staff, General Ma Xiaotian, the two sides
discussed
how to shift the
military relationship to a more sound footing, the importance of maritime
safety
and of maintaining
communication when incidents arise, and regional security issues
including
North Korea,
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. The United States also provided the PLA
with an
update on the
status of the Nuclear Posture Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review,
and
discussed the
importance of openness and transparency in defense matters.
U.S. Chief of
Staff of the Army, General George Casey, visit to China: From August 19-23,
2009, General
George Casey was hosted by Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Ge
Zhenfeng, for a
visit to China. General Casey met with defense and foreign affairs
officials in
Beijing as well as
experts at the Academy of Military Sciences. General Casey also met with
defense officials
in Shenyang and observed PLA company-level training. General Casey’s
objectives were to
solicit the views of China’s leaders on the regional security situation
and to
support further
development of military-to-military exchanges and contacts. General Casey
and
his counterpart
agreed to initiate a program of exchanges along four lines of effort:
cultural
exchanges,
mid-level officer exchanges, functional exchanges, and humanitarian
assistance/disaster
relief exercises.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 58
Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement: The MMCA is a bilateral forum begun in
1989 to
discuss matters
concerning operational and tactical safety at sea. In August 2009 the two
sides
held a special
session of the MMCA to discuss how to invigorate the MMCA mechanism to
improve the safety
of U.S and PRC air and maritime forces when they operate near each other.
In December,
officials held discussions about the MMCA process and discussed PRC
proposals
to make revisions
to the MMCA Charter.
Central Military
Commission Vice Chairman, General Xu Caihou visit to the U.S.: Secretary
Gates hosted the
visit of General Xu to the United States from October 24-31, 2009. During
their meeting the
Secretary reaffirmed the value of maintaining a continuous dialogue based
on
open and
substantive discussion of strategic issues, and achieved consensus with
General Xu on
the types of
military-to-military contacts and exchanges to pursue in 2010: high-level
visits to
build and maintain
a continuous dialogue; cooperation in the area of humanitarian assistance
and disaster
relief; military medical cooperation; expand Service-level exchanges
between the
two Armies;
enhanced mid-grade and junior officer exchanges; culture and sports
exchanges;
and use existing
diplomatic and consultative mechanisms to improve military maritime
operational and
tactical safety. During his trip, General Xu also visited the State
Department,
U.S. Naval
Academy, U.S. Strategic Command, Nellis Air Force Base, Naval Air Station
North
Island, and had a
follow-on visit from November 1-3, to the U.S. Pacific Command.
Defense Policy
Coordination Talks: On December 16 and 17, 2009, the Deputy
Assistant
Secretary of
Defense for East Asia, and his counterpart, the Director of the MND FAO,
convened the fifth
annual DPCT. The talks included representatives from the U.S. Pacific
Command, the Joint
Staff, and the State Department. The discussions reviewed developments
in U.S.-China
military-to-military relations during 2009, and ways to build toward a
continuous
dialogue in 2010.
The discussions also provided both delegations an opportunity to further
build and deepen
bilateral strategic trust, exchange views on a number of regional and
global
issues, and seek
ways to cooperate on areas of mutual interest. Topics covered included
North
Korea, Iran,
Africa, Burma, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The U.S. and PLA delegations
exchanged views on
nonproliferation, and provided briefings on the U.S. Quadrennial Defense
Review and China’s
National Defense Construction, respectively.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 59
Appendix
I:
China
and Taiwan Forces Data
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 60
Taiwan Strait
Military Balance, Ground Forces
China Taiwan
Total Taiwan
Strait Area Total
Personnel (Active)
1.25 million 400,000 130,000
Group Armies 18 8 3
Infantry Divisions
19 6 0
Infantry Brigades 25 11 8
Mechanized
Infantry Divisions 4 1 0
Mechanized
Infantry Brigades 5 1 3
Armor Divisions 9 4 0
Armor Brigades 8 3 4
Artillery
Divisions 2 2 0
Artillery Brigades
17 6 5
Airborne Divisions 3 3 0
Amphibious Divisions 2 2 0
Amphibious Brigades 3 3 3
Tanks 7,000 3,100 1,100
Artillery Pieces 8,000 3,400 1,600
Note: PLA active ground
forces are organized into Group Armies. Infantry, armor, and artillery
units are
organized into a combination of divisions and brigades deployed
throughout the PLA’s
seven MRs. A
significant portion of these assets are deployed in the Taiwan Strait
area,
specifically the
Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan MRs. Taiwan has seven Defense Commands,
three of which
have Field Armies. Each Army contains an Artillery Command roughly
equivalent to a
brigade plus.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 61
Major
Ground Units
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 62
Taiwan Strait
Military Balance, Air Forces
China Taiwan
Aircraft Total
Within range of
Taiwan Total
Fighters 1,680 330 388
Bombers/Attack 620 160 22
Transport 450 40 21
Note: The PLAAF and the
PLA Navy have approximately 2,300 operational combat aircraft.
These consist of
air defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft,
fighter-bombers, and
bombers. An
additional 1,450 older fighters, bombers and trainers are employed for
training
and R&D. The
two air arms also possess approximately 450 transports and over 100
surveillance and
reconnaissance aircraft with intelligence, surface search, and airborne
early
warning capabilities.
The majority of PLAAF and PLA Navy aircraft are based in the eastern
half of the
country. Currently, 490 aircraft could conduct combat operations against
Taiwan
without refueling.
However, this number could be significantly increased through any
combination of
aircraft forward deployment, decreased ordnance loads, or altered mission
profiles.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 63
Major
Air Units
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 64
Taiwan Strait
Military Balance, Naval Forces
China Taiwan
Total East and
South Sea
Fleets Total
Destroyers 25 15 4
Frigates 49 40 22
Tank Landing
Ships/
Amphibious
Transport Dock 27 25 12
Medium Landing
Ships 28 23 4
Diesel Attack Submarines
54 32 4
Nuclear Attack
Submarines 6 2 0
Coastal Patrol
(Missile) 85 65 61
Note: The PLA Navy has
the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and
amphibious warfare
ships in Asia. After years of neglect, the force of missile-armed patrol
craft is also
growing. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the East and South Sea
Fleets
would be expected
to participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The North Sea
Fleet would be
responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coast, but
could
provide
mission-critical assets to support other fleets.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 65
Major
Naval Units
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 66
China’s Missile
Force
China’s Missile
Inventory
Ballistic and
Cruise
Estimated Range
Missiles Launchers
CSS-2 15-20 5-10
3,000+ km
CSS-3 15-20 10-15
5,400+ km
CSS-4 20 20
13,000+ km
DF-31 <10
<10 7,200+ km
DF-31A 10-15 10-15
11,200+ km
CSS-5 85-95 75-85
1,750+ km
CSS-6 350-400
90-110 600 km
CSS-7 700-750
120-140 300 km
DH-10 200-500
45-55 1,500+ km
JL-2 Developmental
Developmental 7,200+ km
Note: China’s Second
Artillery maintains at least five operational SRBM brigades; an
additional two
brigades are subordinate to PLA ground forces—one garrisoned in the
Nanjing
MR and the other
in the Guangzhou MR. All SRBM units are deployed to locations near
Taiwan.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 67
Appendix
II:
Military-to-Military
Exchanges
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 68
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY
CONTACTS FOR THE YEAR 2009
The Department of
Defense engaged in the following military-to-military contacts and
exchanges
with the PLA in
2009. The Office of the Secretary of Defense reviewed and approved each
contact.
A case-by-case
review process allows the Department of Defense to evaluate each exchange
or
contact in terms
of benefit to the United States, adherence to the principles of
reciprocity and
transparency, and
compliance with the statutory limitations contained in Section 1201 of
Public
Law 106-65.
Department
of Defense Exchange or Contact Date
Working-level
Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office Policy Talks and
Joint
POW/MIA Accounting Command Compensation Negotiations Jan
Interactions
between U.S. and PRC Counter-piracy Task Forces in the Gulf of Aden
Continuing
U.S.
Military Academy Superintendent visit to China Feb
Observers
to COBRA GOLD in Thailand Feb
Defense
Policy Coordination Talks in China Feb
AMAN
09 Multilateral Exercise in Pakistan Mar
Pacific
Special Operations Conference in the United States Apr
Defense
Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office Policy/Technical Talks in China
Apr
Chief
of Naval Operations visit to China Apr
Asia
Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) Comprehensive Crisis
Management
Course in the United States May
National
War College delegation visit to China May
Industrial
College of the Armed Forces Industry Studies delegation visit to China
May
Pacific
Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar in Philippines and China May and
Aug
Defense
Consultative Talks in China Jun
U.S.
Pacific Command Non-Commissioned Officer exchange visit to China Jun
PLA
Archives Personnel visit to the United States, including the Marine Corps
University
Archives Jul
PLA
observed KHAAN QUEST Peacekeeping Operations Exercise in Mongolia Jul
China
Visiting Scholar to APCSS in the United States Jul and Sep
APCSS
Advanced Security Cooperation Course in the United States Jul and Sep
Chief of Staff of
the Army visit to China Aug
PLA General Staff
Department-Second Department visit to the United States Aug
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 69
Department
of Defense Exchange or Contact Date
APCSS Transnational
Security Cooperation Course in the United States Aug
Pacific Area Army
Chiefs Conference in Japan Aug
Pacific Area
Armies Management Seminar in Japan Aug
Joint
POW/MIA Accounting Command investigative missions to Sichuan &
Guangxi
Provinces
Aug
Special
Meeting under the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement in China Aug
U.S.
National Defense University (NDU) Annual Strategic Discussions with the
PLA
NDU
in the United States Sep
U.S.
NDU senior-level academic exchange in China Sep
General
Xu Caihou, Central Military Commission Vice Chairman, visit to the United
States
Oct
U.S.
NDU CAPSTONE trip to Beijing Oct
APCSS
Comprehensive Crisis Management Course in the United States Oct
U.S.
NDU mid-level academic exchange in China Oct
PRC
Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Peacekeeping Symposium in China
Nov
U.S.
Pacific Command Non-Commissioned Officer Exchange in the United States
Nov
APCSS
Conference on Collaborative Lessons Learned on U.S.-China Earthquake and
Flood
Response Workshop in the United States Nov
APCSS
Comprehensive Security Response to Terrorism Course in the United States
Nov
Defense
Policy Coordination Talks in the United States Dec
Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement Discussions in the United States Dec
PLA
Engineer Visit to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the United States
Dec
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 70
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY
CONTACTS FOR THE YEAR 2010
The Office of the
Secretary of Defense approved in principle the following U.S.-China
military-tomilitary
contacts for 2010.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense will continue to review each
contact on a
case-by-case basis consistent with Secretary of Defense guidance.
Department
of Defense Exchange or Contact Date
Asia
Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) Transnational Security
Cooperation
Course
1st
QTR
APCSS-Stanford
University Pacific Rim Security Managing the Global Commons 1st
QTR
U.S.
Military Academy Superintendent visit to China 1st QTR
PLA
visit to USA Judge Advocate General School 1st QTR
APCSS
Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism Course 1st
QTR
U.S.
Marine Corps (USMC) School of Advanced Warfare visit to China for study
of World
War
II warfare 1st QTR
PLA
Mid-Grade officers visit to the United States 1st QTR
General
Chen Bingde, chief of the PLA General Staff visit to the United States 1st
QTR
U.S.
Military Academy Foreign Academy Exchange Program 1st/2nd
QTR
Commander,
U.S. Pacific Fleet, visit to China 1st/2nd
QTR
Defense
Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office Policy/Technical Talks in China 2nd
QTR
Joint
POW/MIA Accounting Command investigative mission to China (Korean War) 2nd
QTR
U.S.
Mid-Grade officers visit to China 2nd QTR
USMC
Battle Color Detachment visit to China 2nd QTR
Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement discussions in the United States 2nd
QTR
U.S.
Navy port visit to China 2nd QTR
U.S.
PACOM visit to China 2nd QTR
Defense
Language Institute Language Site Survey/Exchange 2nd QTR
APCSS
Advanced Security Cooperation Course 2nd QTR
Western
Pacific Naval Symposium in Singapore 2nd QTR
U.S.
Army Band Exchange in China 2nd QTR
Secretary
of Defense visit to China 2nd QTR
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 71
Department
of Defense Exchange or Contact Date
Judge
Advocate General Harvard exchange on rule of law in the military 2nd
QTR
PLA
attend Department of Defense Environment, Energy and Sustainability
Symposium in
the
United States 2nd QTR
Office
of the Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs Exchange in China 2nd
QTR
PLA
Navy military medical exchange in the United States 2nd/3rd
QTR
PLA
Navy Commander visit to USMC East Coast facilities 2nd/3rd
QTR
Office
of the Secretary of Defense/Acquisition Technology and Logistics Military
Environmental
Exchange in China 2nd/3rd
QTR
Joint
POW/MIA Accounting Command investigative and recovery missions (Korean
War
and
WWII) 3rd QTR
USMC
Martial Arts program visit to China 3rd QTR
APCSS
Comprehensive Security Responses to Terrorism Course 3rd
QTR
Air
Force Asia Pacific Military Nursing Exchange in Vietnam 3rd
QTR
Pacific
Air Forces Pacific Airlift Rally in Malaysia 3rd QTR
Pacific
Army Management Seminar XXIV in Chile 3rd QTR
Global
Air Chief’s Conference in the United States 3rd QTR
APCSS
Transnational Security Cooperation Course 3rd QTR
U.S.
Army Engineer Exchange in China 3rd QTR
Cadet
Command Reserve Officer Training Corps Language Exchange 3rd
QTR
PLA
Air Force Commander visit to the United States 3rd QTR
USMC
HA/DR Seminar in the United States 3rd QTR
U.S.
Army HA/DR subject matter exchange in China 3rd-4th
QTR
PLA
Navy Commander visit to the United States 3rd/4th
QTR
USMC
Command and Staff College orientation visit to China 3rd/4th
QTR
PLA
Navy Staff visit to the United States 3rd/4th
QTR
PLA
General Logistics Department visit to the United States 3rd/4th
QTR
U.S.
Pacific Command Chiefs of Defense Conference 4th QTR
PLA
Mid-Grade officers visit to the United States 4th QTR
Chief
of Staff of the Army counterpart visit 4th QTR
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 72
Department
of Defense Exchange or Contact Date
APCSS
Advanced Security Cooperation Course 4th QTR
Chief
of Staff of the U.S. Air Force visit to China 4th QTR
Marine
Corps University staff visit 4th QTR
Commander,
Pacific Air Forces, visit to China TBD
Air
Force avian influenza/pandemics rapid response training in China TBD
Air
Force Pacific Rim Senior Enlisted Leader Conference TBD
U.S.
Air Force Academy Site Survey/Exchange TBD
Air
War College Exchange TBD
Army
Marksmanship Unit Sports Exchange TBD
Commanding
General, U.S. Army Pacific visit to China TBD
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff visit to China TBD
Secretary
of the Navy visit to China TBD
PLA
Navy HA/DR visit during PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 2010 on USNS MERCY TBD
U.S.
Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving
China/PRC
Defense White Paper drafters exchange TBD
PLA
Military Region Commander visit to U.S. Pacific Command TBD
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 73
Countries
Visited by Senior Chinese Military Leaders, 2005-2009
2005
2006 2007 2008 2009
Argentina
Bangladesh
Cuba
Denmark
Egypt
Germany
India
Kazakhstan
Netherlands
Philippines
Russia
Sudan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Turkey
Uruguay
Australia
Belarus
Burma
Cambodia
Denmark
France
Hungary
India
Laos
Malaysia
New
Zealand
North
Korea
Norway
Pakistan
Romania
Russia
Singapore
South
Korea
Tajikistan
Thailand
United States
Vietnam
Argentina
Chile
Cuba
Greece
Japan
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Mongolia
Philippines
Russia
South
Korea
Thailand
United
States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Bahrain
Belarus
Brazil
Brunei
Chile
Germany
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
Nepal
Norway
Oman
Qatar
Saudi
Arabia
Serbia-
Montenegro
Singapore
South
Korea
Tajikistan
Thailand
United
Arab
Emirates
Venezuela
Australia
Bulgaria
Burma
Finland
Germany
Japan
New
Zealand
North
Korea
Pakistan
Papua
New
Guinea
Russia
Serbia-
Montenegro
Singapore
Slovakia
South
Korea
Thailand
Turkey
United
States
Vietnam
This
list includes visits led by the vice chairmen of the Central Military
Commission, the Minister of National Defense,
the
Chief of the General Staff, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and
the commanders of the PLAAF and the
PLA
Navy.
Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 74
Senior
Foreign Military Officials Visiting China in 2009
Australia
Bahrain
Belarus
Bolivia
Brazil
Brunei
Burma
Czech
Republic
Egypt
Finland
Germany
Greece
India
Japan
Kenya
Liberia
Macedonia
Malaysia
Maldives
Malta
Mongolia
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
North
Korea
Pakistan
Russia
Senegal
Serbia-Montenegro
South
Korea
Sri
Lanka
Sudan
Tanzania
Thailand
Ukraine
United
Arab Emirates
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
This
list includes visits by senior defense officials and chiefs of the armed
services. This
list excludes visits
associated
with the 60th anniversary
of the founding of the PRC and multilateral military exercises.
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